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Abstractm
Are we experiencing drastic changes in the way civil society and government are related to each other,
and if so, how can we think about these changes and understand their impact on the role and function
of both civil society and government? These questions lead to important topics such as the autonomy of
civil society organisations; the ‘steering’ capabilities of government; marketisation of public services; the
impact of formal rules on practices and strategies of organisations; the nature of partnerships’ and
‘networks’ between government and civil society; the internal complexity and interweaving of actors
from government and civil society; and certainly also the ’messy’ reality in which politics and public
service delivery take place. This paper deals with these questions by engaging with international
literature and presenting the broad lines of a neo-Gramscian analytical framework.
This paper has two major parts (besides an introduction and a conclusion). In the first part we argue
that in order to understand the relationship between civil society and government we must not look at
them as monolithic entitles but instead disentangle their internal differentiation. ”The” civil society is thus
not interacting with ”the” government, instead this interaction is built on a diverse reality of mutually
enforcing or conflicting relations with different actors across both civil society and government. This set
of relations between the internally differentiated domains and actors of civil society and government
constitutes the governance arrangement that we will focus on in our research.
ln the second part of the paper we engage critically with the literature on public governance. The
governance literature states that in the modern world there is no central position, institution or system
from which the social and political order can be controlled. This is usually stated in contrast to earlier
modern society wherein government still assumed a central position as the command-and—control
centre of society. In the evolution of governance, this literature claims, hierarchy (the bureaucratic state)
has been displaced by markets and networks. We propose a conceptual, a historical and a normative
critique on this literature, on which we then build our proposal for a neo—Gramscian perspective on
government and civil society. We do not set out to present a fully worked out theory, instead we bring
different insights together from which we can then further develop our understanding of governance
arrangements in future research.
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 1 I Introduction
Understanding how civil society and government are related requires an understanding of society, in
other words: a social theory. lt is with the start of the ‘modernisation’ of society (usually situated around
the end ofthe eighteenth century) that the fundamental issues of social theory were developed (Wagner,
2001). Much has happened in social theories since then, certainly concerning the way in which
government and civil society have been conceptualised and understood. Contemporary literature on
government and civil society captures much ofthe dynamic between these two entities under the notion
of ‘governance’. This is at once a very distinct and a very vague concept. lt is vague because in the
enormous body of literature on governance it sometimes seems that it means everything, and thus
suffers from concept-stretching beyond usability (6, 2015a). However, while some of these critiques
concerning overly broad interpretations have some merit, the concept still has its own distinct contours
because it is constructed on specific theoretical assumptions concerning the evolution of the modern
world. The main assumptions are that in the modern world there is no central position, institution or
system from which the social and political order can be controlled. As we will discuss in the third
paragraph, various social theories speak of a qualitative change in modernisation that has led to this
situation. This change entails a complex issue: if society has no distinct centre, how is social and political
change then to be achieved? ls change then only possible in a haphazard way, emerging from the
clashing of events scattered through society? Or can there still be some form of coordination in society
through which social change can be achieved? ‘Governance’ literature is a collection of theoretical
attempts to analyse societal efforts at social and political order (Ansell 8 Torflng, 2016). Not all authors
agree on the extent of coordination possible, rangingfrom very minimal interaction (e.g. Luhmann, 1997)
to the coordination efforts of an engaged state that brings together multiple interacting self—organislng
networks and systems (e.g Jessop, 2016) and those emphasising the new yet still strong governing
capacities of states (e.g. Bell 8 Hindmoor, 2009).
This very brief discussion is then how we will frame our analysis of the relationship of government and
civil society: given their societal position (which we will discuss in depth), how can we understand the
relationship between government and civil society? This immediately implies that this relationship stands
at the heart of the debate on social order and change: if modernisation has resulted in a decentred
society, ‘governance’ implies that new methods of coordination between government, civil society and
other social institutions (most notably markets and the system of law) are required in order to be able to
achieve collective social goals. However, some issues arise in the literature on governance that will be
addressed in this paper.
First of all, two meanings of governance are at play. At its core, governance expresses the belief that
collective coordination is still possible, without consideration for specific institutional designs. However,
a specific meaning of governance is in some regards dominating the literature (Davies 8 Spicer, 2015):
governance as specifically referring to "network governance“. /n this paper we argue that to study the
first meaning (societal steering) social theory should not limit itself to the second meaning (network
governance). On the contrary, we argue that ‘network governance‘ suffers from some considerable
conceptual flaws that need to be addressed. We will argue that ‘network governance’ wrongly
emphasizes a grand historical shift in the second half of the twentieth century whereby a ‘hierarchical
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government-led‘ system has given way to the rise of networks as the new dominant forms of
governance. This is based not only on a selective reading of historical research, but also on a misreading
of the concepts of networks, markets and hierarchies. Instead of following the much-used distinction
between these three ‘modes of governance’, we propose a more agnostic model for analysis (6, 2015a;
Davies 8 Spicer, 2015). We do not propose to discard of these three concepts but to apply them more
consistently.
ln order to do so we will first have to consider the separate entities of government and civil society. ln
the second paragraph we will offer a basic description of the internal complexities of both entities. We
consider both government and civil society as multidimensional concepts that should not be considered
too easily as social domains that can be understood under a single narrative. Specifically, this means
that civil society is not merely ‘dominated’ by governments or that civil society's main contribution to
the social order is through resisting governmental actions - although many authors agree that when it
comes to the coordination of social and political goals governments have more instruments and power
at their disposal (Lowndes 8 Roberts, 2013). We wish to emphasise how both civil society and
government contribute to, influence and constrain social and political change.
We will present a Gramscian inspired framework in order to analyse this relationship. This conceptual
framework sees governments and civil society as closely integrated entities of the state. From this
perspective thinking about social order and change, and the role of government and civil society,
immediately entails thinking about the production, distribution and functioning of power in society. More
specifically this framework points to three dimensions of power relevant to the discussion of governance:
the construction of hegemonies throughout civil society and governments, the use of coercive power,
and the performative power of knowledge and techniques. In our research we will use this framework
to focus on specific governance arrangements that are constructed around social issues or policy
domains, whereby we will pay specific attention to the interplay between formal rules (legal and
administrative rules and procedures, organisational rules, ...) and informal practices (norms, values, ‘the
way things are done’).
This paper and our research is part of the research project “Civil Society Innovation in Flanders“ (“CSl
Flanders“), which was established in response to a series of public debates in Flanders in 2012-2013
organised by “de \/erenigde Verenigingen“ (‘the United Associations’), an association consisting of key
players of large Flemish civil society organisations‘. The participants in these debates were concerned
that civil society in Flanders is facing new challenges in its political work and in its role of public service
delivery in the Belgian welfare state. Historically, civil society in Belgium (and Flanders) has been crucial
in the development ofthe welfare state, the evolution ofthe cultural and educational landscape and more
generally in the construction of social consensus (Huyse, 2003; \/anthemsche, 2014; Witte, Craeybeckx,
8 Meynen, 2009). But social life has evolved from the time of ‘general social consensus‘ (the immediate
postwar period) to a time of economic crisis and political upheaval (in the seventies and eighties, and
again today). The nineties brought with it the paradigm of‘new public management‘, and more generally
a rise in (neo)liberal policies. And with the start of a new century new paradigms are taking hold,
accompanied by growing critiques on the neoliberal political agenda. From these critiques new
approaches to governance are being developed, claiming the rise of new forms of governance in which
governments, civil society organisations and other societal actors form networks and partnerships based
on trust and reciprocal relations. Throughout this historical development, the bureaucratic state is often
relegated to a distant past, cast aside as an outdated and ineffective machine. But when looked at more
closely, it seems that in reality a complex interplay between elements of ‘network governance‘,
bureaucratic government as well as new public management are at work. CSI Flanders was established
I httnI//www.dt§ver:t2riigdevertrriigiiig<:ri.bc/ovtri~oiis/wie~Ziiii~w0 (only available in Dutch)
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to assess the claims ofincreasing marketisation, manageria/ism and depoliticisation that are supposedly
shaping this changing relationship between government and civil society. Therefore, while civil society
is often acknowledged for its impact on social capital (Billiet, 2004; Edwards, 2014; Elchardus, Hooghe,
8 Smits, 2000), we will focus on its role in public service delivery and its political role (see box 1 below).
Our leading research question is how, concerning these roles, the interaction between civil society and
governments is formed throughout specific governance arrangements. The analytical framework we will
develop here is therefore built on a critical discussion of governance and state theory and works towards
unpacking the construction of governance arrangements.
Box 1: Politics and Service Delivery
When we talk about politics in this paper, we are using it as a multi-layered concept referring to the often
used distinction between politics, polity and policy (lessop, 2016; Kaid 8 Holtz—Bacha, 2008; Palonen, 2003;
Pennings, Keman, 8 Kleinnijenhuis, 2006). The most narrow conception of politics refers to policy and
policymaking: the ‘art of the possible’. It concerns the specific collective choices to act (or not to act)
concerning specific social issues. A second conception of politics is broader, and refers to politics as the
setting of the collective goals, and is not immediately tied to specific policy decisions. Here, politics is tied to
how actors in the state (among which governments and civil society) are related regarding the construction
of these collective goals. Politics is thus a confrontation of different social forces and different interests
concerning the form ofthe state. This confrontation takes place inside the polity: “the institutional matrix that
establishes a distinctive terrain, realm, domain, field, or region of specifically political actions“ (lessop, 2016,
p. 17). ln sum, the role of civil society in politics can refer to all these dimensions: organising services to
implement policies, the influence on the development of policies, political representation and advocacy of
specific groups, and organising (agonistic) conflict.
This definition of politics also captures how public service delivery is always part of politics: public services
are part of the specific policies that decide ‘who gets what and how‘ and form an important part of the
construction of the polity. The fact that organisations are only ‘instruments’ for service delivery, or on the
contrary, that they are important partners in the policy development says something about the political
process. In analysing service delivery by civil society organisations we have to pay close attention to how
these services are constructed: is implementation dominated by government programs, is the policy made
to match the concerns of civil society, or is the way services are organised driven by social processes that
transcend the distinction government/civil society (e.g. individualisation, commodification, ...)? The key issue
is to understand that public services do not occur in a political vacuum but actively shape the political sphere
in which they operate.
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2 I Internal differentiation of government and civil
society
Before we can discuss the relationship between government and civil society in depth, it is important to
discuss what these concepts mean and how they are to be used for our research. We will do this in two
steps. In the current paragraph we will outline the contours of civil society and government. For
conceptualising civil society we will build on Edwards‘ insightful synthesis (Edwards, 201 1, 2014) ofthree
different approaches: civil society as part of society (associational life), as a certain kind of society (a
normative concept), and as the public sphere. For conceptualising government it is equally important to
present it as a multi-layered and internally complex and differentiated social entity. In the next paragraph
we will then proceed to a discussion of governance literature and use a Gramscian inspired framework
to understand the dynamics between civil society and government. This is an important step, because
while in the current paragraph civil society and government are discussed as separate entities, a
Gramscian perspective will point to their close interconnectedness as the pillars of the ‘integral state‘.
2.1 Civil Society
When it comes to civil society it is clear that there is a wide array of literature on what exactly civil
society is with many insightful contributions (Arato, 1994; Bunyan, 2014; Cohen 8 Arato, 1997; Edwards,
2014; Evers 8 Laville, 2005). Often the term “third sector“ is used (Taylor, 2010), but also concepts such
as nonprofit sector (Salamon 8 Anheier, 1998) or social economy (Evers 8 Laville, 2005; Moulaert 8
Ailenei, 2005). These different approaches all aim to capture the dynamics of a ‘sector’, social sphere or
domain that is distinct from other social spheres, most notably ‘government’ and ‘markets’ (Cohen 8
Arato, 1997). Edwards‘ study (2011) on the history and development of the concept has led him to
distinguish three different approaches, which we discuss further in this section.
2.1.1 Civil society as associations
The first approach considers civil society as a distinct part of society that consists ofthose associations
that are not exclusively tied to the spheres of government, market or family (Edwards, 2014, pp. 19—20).
This concept of civil society is often dubbed “third sector“, and is a key concept in literature on public
governance (Brandsen, Donk, 8 Putters, 2005; Evers 8 Laville, 2005; Pestoff, 1992; Taylor, 2010; \/an de
Donk, 2008). At their core, these associations are usually considered to be voluntary private formal non-
profit organisations that have a certain public purpose (Salamon 8 Sokolowski, 2016).
2.1.2 Civil Society as the ‘good’ society
The second approach to civil society is to regard it as “a shorthand for the kind of society in which we
want to live“ (Edwards, 2014, p. 44), constructed around shared ideals and norms. This vision on civil
society is remarkably different from the first perspective. Whereas the first perspective is a formal
approach to civil society, in this second perspective a normative approach forms the centre of analysis.
This difference is important since it shows that associational life does not guarantee a shared set of
norms and values of itself, and the normative integration of civil society is not purely a matter of forming
associations (Edwards, 2014). At the same time, normative integration does not necessarily mean that
the actors in this civil society pursue progressive goals (democratic agenda, equity, iustice, etc.) or even
 6 
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that they are acting according to certain notions of civility (Evers, 2010). As Edwards indicates, religious
organisations are good examples of the diversity in normative integration, ranging from liberal to
conservative, inclusionary to exclusionary, openness and prejudice (2014, p. 53). In a discussion on
Gramsci‘s take on civil society, Buttigieg also explores the role of the religious movement in the US as
an example of how conservative forces in civil society can achieve important social and political impact
(Buttigieg, 2005).
2.1.3 Civil society as the public sphere
In this approach civil society is regarded as the ‘public sphere’: “the arena for argument and deliberation
as well as for association and institutional collaboration“ (Edwards, 2014, p. 67). Where the first
perspective was formal, the second was normative, this third perspective offers a politicaltake on civil
society. There is considerable debate on how civil society functions as a public sphere. Jurgen
Habermas‘ contributions have long dominated the debate (Edwards, 2014; Habermas, 1984, 1987).
Habermas argues that actors are able to engage which each other in the public sphere through shared
assumptions of the world, which Habermas calls the ‘lifeworld‘: they share certain cultural assumptions,
they assume that certain societal norms and rules will be accepted and followed by all involved, and
they assume that each actor expects to be held accountable (Habermas, 1987).
This approach has been criticised for being more normative than analytical, a view summarised by
Flyvbjerg: “This is the fundamental political dilemma in Habermas‘s thinking: he describes to us the
utopia of communicative rationality but not how to get there.“ (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 215). Missing from
Habermas‘ view on civil society is how power relations in society operate and how they affect social and
political conditions. Antonio Gramsci takes a very different approach to civil society, focusing sharply on
these power struggles in society (Gramsci, 2006). Gramsci‘s goal is to understand how political power is
distributed in society and the crucial roles of civil society and government in this process. Focussing on
civil society in this regard gives us the insight that a strong civil society (in the first and second meaning)
does not in and of itself lead to social consensus. On the contrary, an active civil society entails different
actors in different Dositions with different interests — which makes consensus even more unlikely. A
strong civil society is the basis ofthe public sphere (Edwards, 2014) and because ofthis it only guarantees
conflict (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Some authors even see conflict as a necessary condition of the political
process (Mouffe, 1999, 2005; Ranciere, 1999). Understanding civil society as a public sphere thus
requires us to understand how conflict and power works.
2.1.4 Researching civil society
Our research focuses on associations in civil society in a very broad manner, drawing from the above
discussed dimensions. ln general then, in the context of the CSI Flanders project, associations in civil
society are understood “as organisations that aim to generate social change, perform a political or civic
role in society and/or provide services that are not exclusively private to citizens“ (Oosterlynck,
Hertogen, 8 Swerts, 2017)? First of all, we will focus on associations in civil society that have some form
of social or collective goals. This certainly means the organisations discussed in the first approach, but
also the normative dimension of civil society. Secondly, we will include associations that have a certain
political role and/or offer public services or goods. These dimensions are not always clearly separated
(as we have discussed in Box 1) since public services can be crucial in the development of social and
political goals such as equality, equity, justice, health, education, etc. (S. P. Osborne, 2010). Thirdly, the
associations that we include have to be initialised by actors form civil society and not from government.
Since many associations have developed close connections to governmental institutions (through
regulations, financing, oversight, etc.), this condition of voluntary existence of private initiative offers an
empirical argument for demarcation
2 CSI Flanders Working Paper 1
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While this definition might seem clear, it is important to realise that any conceptualisation of civil society
entails blurry boundaries between government, market and civil society, and that civil society
organisations can and do cross these boundaries. A good example of blurring boundaries concerns the
‘social economy’ in Europe (Evers 8 Laville, 2005; Salamon 8 Sokolowski, 2016), where the lines
between civil society organisations and markets are not always easily drawn. These organisations are
active on certain markets in the form of cooperatives, social enterprises or mutual-type organisations
(providing services and goods for customers, e.g. health care, second hand goods, landscaping services,
labour market integration, ...). Ouestions regarding increasing commercialisation, managerialism, or
corporatisation are certainly relevant here and put pressure any sharp boundary drawing. (Suykens,
\/erschuere, 8 De Rynck, 2017)?
The complementary approaches to civil society discussed in this paragraph highlight the importance of
developing an analytical framework that is able to deal with a high degree of complexity as well as
conceptual boundaries that are not always perfectly clear in practice. Additionally, civil society does not
operate in a social vacuum but has many ties with other parts of society. Indeed, our research is
specifically concerned with how civil society is ‘related to‘ government, which is a very complex concept
in its own right, as we will discuss in the following paragraph.
2.2 Government
Government must be observed with the same attention for internal complexities as we have done for
civil society. The point is that we should not only look at the relation between government and civil
society from a perspective of (usually largely undifferentiated) social systems or spheres, but we must
also pay attention to social actors (individuals and organisations) inside government and civil society in
relation to each other. ln order to achieve this, the internal complexity of governments has to be
conceptualised. A good point of departure to understand government is offered by Heywood (2013) in
his handbook on politics, where he distinguishes between three perspectives on “government” based on
its function, its institutions and its narrow meaning of ‘executive’.
“Government in its broadest sense, refers to any mechanism through which ordered rule is
maintained, its central features being the ability to make collective decisions and the capacity
to enforce them. However, the term is more commonly understood to describe the formal and
institutional processes that operate at the national level to maintain public order and facilitate
collective action. The core functions of government are, thus, to make law (legislation),
implement law (execution) and interpret law (adjudication). ln some cases, the political
executive (...) alone is referred to as ‘the government‘/’ (Heywood, 2013, p. 266)
2.2.1 Collective decision making
ln Heywood‘s approach to government we can see the fundamental connection between government
and politics. Earlier we have argued that politics is to be understood “as the setting of the collective
goals“ (see Box 1). Thus, by arguing that government “in its broadest sense" refers to this same function,
we can see here how Heywood almost equates government with politics. The main difference here lies
in the added capacity of government to enforce decisions, which is of course the classical understanding
of the distinctive monopoly on violence of government. While politics refers to the social construction of
collective goals, governments “are authorized to express and enforce“ collective decisions (Moeller,
2012, Chapter 8).
3 CSI Flanders Working Paper 3
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2.2.2 The many institutions of government
The second dimension in Heywood’s definition consists of the institutions ofgovernmentthat organise
the different authorities of decision making. These institutions are the executive and the legislature, as
well as police and military (as Heywood points out, ‘government’ is sometimes used as a shorthand for
just the executive branch). Furthermore, there are also the many entities that administer specific policy
domains (e.g. energy, infrastructure, health, education, culture, etc.)
The legislature is the institution that most symbolises the democratic character of the state (Devos,
2016). Together with the executive it is characterised by the continuous interplay between opposition
and majority (Luhmann, 1990). This is a dynamic that gives particular importance to political parties who
in many Western European countries are very much the dominating force in political decision-making.
ln Belgium political parties dominate so many aspects of government that the political system has been
labelled a “partitocracy“ (Dewachter, 2001; van Haute, Amjahad, Borriello, Close, 8 Sandri, 2013) where
parties “can be considered the effective principals in the polity, and many actors of the parliamentary
chain ofdelegation, such as MPs, ministers, and civil servants have been reduced to mere party agents.“
(De Winter 8 Dumont, 2006, p. 957). Historically, political parties have played an important role in
integrating civil society and the political system in a so-called ‘pillarised‘ Belgian society (Witte et al.,
2009). While pillarisation no longer has the same reach as it once had (see Box 2), recent research still
shows links between the historically ‘pillar parties‘ and civil society (van Haute et al., 2013).
Political parties have been of particular concern in discussions on civil society: are they in or out of civil
society? This debate has divided scholars, which leaves Edwards to conclude: “The only acceptable
compromise seems to be that political parties are in civil society when they are out of office and out of
civil society when they are in.” (Edwards, 2014, p. 26). Jessop (2016) instead accepts the dual role of
political parties and places them between civil society and government, constantly mediating between
both: on the one hand they represent interests of social groups and are part of the public sphere, on the
other hand they occupy positions in government from where they have considerable power over its
institutions.
2.2.3 Different spatial scales
Thirdly, government, in all of its meanings (function, institutions, executive), operates on differentspatial
scales (local, regional, national and international or global). Government operates inside a certain
territory in which it has authority, which is something that is not fixed but part of continuous social
construction (Sassen, 2006). lt is also not the same “government” at work in these different scales as
institutions can vary greatly. As a system of decision making, multiple forms of government can be at
play atthe same time (for example a national democratic government that is dealing with an international
technocratic government). Thus, it is important to consider the relationship between local, regional,
national and international institutions of governments (as can be seen in the large literature on ‘multi-
level governance’). The practical reality of governing has led to complex relations between governments
on these scales, creating a variety of agencies and partnerships between them.
2.2.4 Politics and administration
Fourthly, there is an important distinction to be made between the political dimension of government
and the administrative dimension. ln a strict interpretation of this distinction administrators would be
considered as merely implementing policy under the full authority and responsibility of the elected
political officials. ln reality room for operational decision-making is built into governmental structures
through deconcentration via internal and external agencies (De Rynck, 2016; Mewes, 2011). Besides
collective actors (departments, agencies) individual administrators are also worth considering here. We
know that administrators are not passive subordinates of the political executives, but that they have
considerable discretion in carrying out their tasks (Lipsky, 2010), and can even have considerable
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influence on policymaking. Administrators can even develop strategies that can have significant impact
on the policy they are intended to implement (e.g. Prior 8 Barnes, 2011).
ln practice, how rules actually operate in particular settings depends on the interactions notjust of social
structures and institutions, but also ofthe interaction between administrators, politicians as well as actors
in civil society. This is often referred to as the difference between formal rules and “rules-in—use“, and
highlights how important it is to develop a framework that extends beyond a formal institutional analysis
(Lowndes, Pratchett, 8 Stoker, 2006; Lowndes 8 Roberts, 2013).
2.2.5 Observing government
So far we have presented various dimensions of government: its function (organising and enforcing
collective decision-making), its institutions, its different scales of operation, and some of its most
important actors. The result is once again a high degree of complexity that clearly shows how
government is anything but a monolithic unidirectional entity. Inside governments contradictions,
conflicts or mutual enforcements arise as much as they do in civil society — between local and national
governments, between intra-governmental departments, between different agencies, between
administrators, between departments and cabinets, etc.
When we ask how government relates to civil society, we have to consider this complex internal
differentiation. The issue could be rephrased using the plural form (‘governments’), but this hardly seems
a solution — if not for the fact that it seems as if we are trying to relate civil society to different national
executives. Instead we argue that in order to take up this internal differentiation (of both civil society and
government) the relationship between government and civil society should be considered in terms of
how ‘governance arrangements’ are constructed. To clarify this more, we will have to turn to the
literature on ‘governance’.
2.3 Using typologies
Before we move forward to present our approach for analysing the governance arrangements in
Flanders, a moment is needed to talk about the use of typologies. The literature on the relationship
between government and civil society organisations (CSO‘s) offers several attempts at constructing
typologies of the dynamics between both spheres (Coston, 1998; Furneaux 8 Ryan, 2014; Mcloughlin,
2011; Najam, 2000; \/erschuere 8 De Corte, 2014; Young, 2000). We believe these typologies can be
useful instruments in presenting some partial aspects of the dynamics involved, but in light of the
previously discussed internal complexities of both governments and civil society typologies can also be
overly reductionist and simplifying. The very nature of typologies results in an undifferentiated view of
government and civil society that is also usually a static view which can only capture some relations at
a certain point in time. Some authors also find that many of these typologies lack sufficient empirical
testing (Furneaux 8 Ryan, 2014; Mcloughlin, 2011; \/erschuere 8 De Corte, 2014). Moreover, we should
consider the constraints of constructing typologies. lf typologies only list the different types of relations
according to a two-dimensional scheme, the resulting analysis remains firmly trapped in the specificity
of the immediate observations. Typologles have a limited ability to capture the historical development
of a relationship — although a possible solution might lie in the construction of overviews of how
relationships have evolved from one ‘type’ to another ‘type’ or how different types have coexisted from
time to time. While we consider some typologies to be useful as concise methods of conveying partial
information, it is at the very least important that these typologies capture the internal differentiation of
both government and civil society, which they usually do not do.
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An example of a typology that is less focused on the internal complexities of governance—arrangements
is the often-cited typology of Young (2000) which presents three ‘idealtypical’ relations between
government and civil society (supplementary, complementary, adversarial). Young considers these
relations not to be mutually exclusive (2000, p. 151), offering some degree of complexity. However,
Young also explicitly abstracts “from some of the messy detail of the real world“ (2000, p. 151) in order
to construct a more abstract model wherein the relation between government and civil society is
considered only as a relation between the two domains ‘in general’. As such, while valuable as a tool to
discuss possible general types of relationships, it offers little further information. However, we do find
that some authors succeed in constructing typologies that consider the internal complexities of
governments and try to integrate it. Two often cited examples are the typologies developed by Coston
(1998) and Najam (2000). Another one is a recent effort by Furneaux and Ryan (2014), who propose a
five-dimensional typology.
2.3.1 Coston: asymmetrical power relations
Coston (1998) developed a model in which relations between government and nongovernmental
organisations are placed on an eight-point continuum. This continuum ranks the types of relationships
according to the “government actor‘s relative acceptance or resistance to institutional pluralism, degree
offormalization ofthe relationship, and the relative power asymmetry in the relationship.“ (1998, p. 362).
She acknowledges that “Governments are not monolithic: regimes of all types may incorporate agencies
and actors that are more cooperative or repressive than the overall regime.“ (1998, p. 363). Coston also
emphasises that the power-relation between governments and CSOs are inherently asymmetrical:
governments can dominate CSOs more than the other way around. The result is a continuum in which
three types of relations are considerably more asymmetrical (repression, rivalry and competition), and
five tend to have more balanced power relations (contracting, third party, cooperation, complementarity,
collaboration). The value of Coston‘s approach lies in the attention it gives to different dimensions of the
power asymmetry between governments and CSOs and the room it leaves for individual cases within
the same sector to differ greatly. Her approach indeed takes into account how particular governments
and CSOs are situated in a wider political and institutional context.
2.3.2 Najam: goals and strategies
Najam (2000) has constructed a typology based on the goals and strategies ofthe organisations involved
and how they align. This way he constructs four categories which he calls the Four C‘s: cooperation
(similar goals and similar strategies), confrontation (different goals, different strategies),
complementarity (similar goals, but different strategies) and co—optation (different goals, but similar
strategies). The value here is that Najam shows how specific organisations can relate to different parts
of government in several ways, depending on what is at stake and how each actor tries to achieve their
goals. Najam‘s typology thus brings into view how organisations “are driven not just by the grand
scheme of sectors and politics, but by the reality and rationality of their institutional interests and
priorities“ (2000, p. 391). He also explicitly acknowledges that governments, like CSOs, are not
monolithic entities: “different agencies and actors within the same government can nurture different
types of relationships with a given NGO, and vice versa.” (2000, p. 391). Thus, by explicitly focusing on
a specific dimension of the interaction between civil society and government (goals and strategies), the
model is able to communicate a more complex yet still concise view. ln our research project this typology
can be a useful tool for describing how mission statements and organisational strategies align with
governmental policy views and strategies.
2.3.3 Furneaux 8 Ryan: multidimensional analysis
A last typology we would like to briefly discuss, is the five-dimensional model proposed by Furneaux
and Ryan (2014) in their study of Australian civil society organisations. They conclude their paper with a
conceptual, not yet empirically tested, model using five factors: power asymmetry, conditions to funding,
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goal and value alignment, shared planning and decision-making, and criteria for accountability. Each
factor can be scored (they propose using scores from 1 to 5) and the result is a web-like overview of
each organisations overall scores. What‘s interesting about this model is that it aims to offer an
alternative to the two—dimensional models that are mostly used. We think this can be a valuable
approach since it combines the advantages of typologies with the strength of a more complex multi-
dimensional analyses.
2.3.4 Typologies and the relation of power
While these different typologies take into account some of our concerns regarding the internal
complexity of both governments and civil society, there is still a considerable loss of information in the
construction of indicators. For instance in Coston‘s model the “degree of formalisation“ is a useful
descriptor, but the interaction between formal processes and informal practices is not captured. Indeed,
how formal rules operate in the interaction between actors in civil society organisations and
governments needs to be addressed in relation to informal practices as well as discourse. The degree
of formalisation in itself, while being important information to obtain, says little about the processes of
power that surround the construction and functioning of these formal rules, procedures, norms,
contracts, and so on. Indeed, we would argue that the “degree of formalisation” in the relationship is
already a part of the “relative power asymmetry in the relationship". We can see something similar in
the models of Furneaux and Ryan, in which power is expressed as “power asymmetry” and treated on
the same analytical level as the other dimensions in the model.
We believe that Najam‘s model can be useful in the wider framework that we develop in this paper.
Because the model focuses on a specific aspect ofthe relationship between an organisation and parts of
government (goals and strategies) it can result in some useful insights if one were to apply this across
organisations or sectors. Even from a historical perspective, it can present different historical moments
in succession to each other. importantly, Najam‘s model can highlight if and how different types of
relationships (in terms of goals and strategies) are at work between an organisation and different parts
of government. This can then be used in a wider analysis of the relationship that links these strategies
and goals to the social positions and interests ofthe actors involved.
2.4 Focussing on ‘governance arrangements‘
A complex picture emerges from these insights on the different dimensions of civil society and
government and the use of typological classifications. ln civil society there are many different types of
organisations, from local to global initiatives: neighbourhood committees; grassroots movements;
nonprofits that provide health care, education or social services; social enterprises; or even a ‘global civil
society’ based on ‘civility’ (Jordan, ch.8 in Edwards, 2011). All these types of civil society represent
different interests, values and ideas; they take on differentforms and sizes, and occupy different positions
in the public sphere. On the side of government we find different levels of government with different
authorities, agendas and resources; different actors inside these governments, on the side of politics as
well as administration, who can have conflicting interests or outlooks; and different types of relations
(financial, regulatory, oversight, etc.) that can conflict with or reinforce each other. “Civil society“ is thus
not merely interacting with “government” but this interaction is built on a diverse reality of mutually
enforcing or conflicting relations with different actors of both civil society and government. This set of
relations between the internally differentiated domains of civil society and government constitutes the
governance arrangementthat we will focus on in our research.
Consequently, the next step we need to take is to show how we can analyse these relations. While
certain typologies can offer useful insights in partial dynamics of the relationship between government
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and civil society, we still need a more general framework for understanding this relationship — one in
which the partial dynamics identified by typological research can be placed and understood in broader
terms. in short, we need a wider theory of society.
in the following paragraph we will discuss the literature on ‘governance’ — a concept used to capture the
dynamic between government and the rest of society in light of perceived changes in contemporary
society. As we will discuss below, many authors believe that government’s role in society has changed
drastically. The central idea is that government is dependent on other social actors to be able to fulfil its
function of collective decision-making, also referred to as ‘steering’. its relations with the domains ofcivil
society and the market are key to this function. Some authors argue that government can no longer
occupy a central coordination position. Others emphasise the opposite and argue that government
remains the crucial social arena for societal steering, if not as a central commander than at least as the
central coordinator.
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 3 I Government, Civil Society and Governance
This section explores how the relationship between government and civil society has been studied
extensively from the perspective of governance. Before we discuss this concept further below, we can
define it in general as:
"the process of steering society and the economy through collective action and in accordance
with common goals" (Ansell 8 Torflng, 2016, p. 4).
The central idea in this definition is that actors in the political system together with actors in other societal
systems (such as the market and civil society) piece together collectively binding decisions, thus
involving processes of shared political decision-making and societally distributed public service delivery.
A similar idea has been expressed by Meuleman:
“Governance is the totality of interactions, in which government, other public bodies, private
sector and civil society participate, aiming at solving societal problems or creating societal
opportunities.“ (Meuleman, 2008, p. 11).
in academic literature, especially Anglo-Saxon literature, this relationship between the political system
and civil society has been described in terms of a historical shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’,
meaning that in the course of the last century power over politics and public services has been
transferred from central government to a wider range of public and private actors. in this literature
‘governance’ appears in two meanings: on the one hand as a view on societal steering, on the other
hand as a distinct form of societal steering, namely ‘network governance’. in this paper we will argue
that to study the first meaning (societal steering) theory should not limit itself to the second meaning
(network governance). indeed, the idea of a historical shift towards ‘network governance‘ is built on
historical, conceptual and normative misunderstandings ofthe concept of governance, especially in the
context of European welfare states. This will be discussed in depth in section 3.3.
We will first explore how this idea of a ‘shift’ is based to a great extent on underlying theories of
modernity. "Modernisation", a concept around which most of the early classical sociological science
developed (Wagner, 2001), refers in general to the transition in the 18th and 19th century from
'Gemeinschaft‘ to 'Gesellschaft'. This transition is mostly defined in terms of one or more processes of
individualisation, secularisation, rationalisation, reification, cultural fragmentation, role differentiation and
commodification - and in general these processes also occur in descriptions of contemporary society
that claim a ‘second phase’ of modernity (Laermans, 2003). According to many authors this process of
modernisation has entered a new phase, starting from the last decades of the twentieth century. This
new phase has been called ‘postmodernity‘ (Lyotard, 2010 (1984)), ‘liquid’ modernity (Bauman, 2000),
‘reflexive’ modernisation (Beck, Giddens, 8 Lash, 1994), ‘risk'-society (Beck, 1992), or ‘network society’
(Castells, 2010b). We referto these theories in general as “post—structuralist“ (Marinetto, 2003a) or “post—
traditional“ (Lee, 2006), and will show that they have strong conceptual links to the academic literature
on ‘governance’. These post—traditional theories argue that society has become structured without a
centre, that power has become diffused throughout a wide array of actors and structures, and that
traditional institutions have become unstable and fluid. These claims are central to the development of
the concept of governance, together with the idea of a large transformation in the way government and
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civil society interact. Key to this idea of ‘transformation’ is the ‘displaced’ position of government. This
is most obvious in the literature on "network governance” (e.g. as critiqued by Davies (2011b, 2012a,
2012b)), and while we do not wish to dispute the important role that networks play in contemporary
society, we do wish to qualify its importance and present some important critiques on the idea of
‘governance as displacement’. Following the general definition we have presented at the start, we want
to discuss governance as a way of capturing the relationship between government, civil society and
markets as the construction of collective decisions - which is an inherently political relationship. As such,
it is crucial to develop an understanding of how conflict and consensus is generated and managed by
the relevant social actors (Pierre 8 Peters, 2005). After we have discussed the social theories underlying
the development of the concept of governance, we will therefore turn to ways of understanding this
important political dimension ofthe relationship between government and civil society. We will turn to
notions of state, hegemony and governmentality; building on insights from Gramsci, Foucault and
Jessop.
3.1 Post-traditional theories
The two central themes that combine these post-traditional theories are the decline of traditional
structures and, related to this, the decentring of the modern state. We will present some of the central
ideas of these two themes. The following discussion is not so much meant as an affirmation of these
theories, but as an exploration of the themes that connect these theories to the conceptual development
of ‘governance’. Through these linkages we can ground our discussion of governance more firmly in the
wider sociological theory, building towards our own critical understanding.
3.1.1 The decline of traditional structures
in social theory the notion of society, and the place of the individual in it, has become increasingly
problematic (Schinkel, 2007). Above all, the notion of a decline of traditional structures is an important
frame for the debate on the relationship between government and civil society. A crucial theory in
academic literature is that of ”reflexive modernisation” (Beck, Bonss, 8 Lau, 2003; Beck et al., 1994; Lee,
2006), which states that society is fundamentally transformed in a ‘second phase‘ of modernisation:
traditional structures that once seemed fixed have become uncertain and fluid (Bauman, 2000), although
this does not mean that structures have become entirely obsolete (there are still rules, expectations,
values, identities, institutions, ...)‘. Several causes are identified: globalisation, intensified
individualisation, transformed gender roles, flexible employment, and risk politics (associated closely to
the global ecological crisis) (Beck et al., 2003). This has important consequences for the role of
government and politics in society. in a ‘risk society‘ politics cannot be managed by experts alone but
has to rely on other mechanisms for dealing with risks: decentralisation, public consultation, public-
private partnerships, citizen involvement and participation (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler, 8 Mayer, 2000).
Already we can see here how an underlying view on contemporary society is linked to ways of
organising the governance ofthis society. in this strand ofsocial theory modernity has become ‘reflexive’
in the sense that individuals have the ability to reflect more than before on the state of the social order
and their place in it (Beck et al., 1994). However, in this view on modernisation, society no longer offers
clear integrating narratives, but instead relies on ‘flows of communications’ in fast working networks,
which means that it no longer has the traditional structures to offer stability of identity or meaning for
modern individuals (Lash, 2001). Consequently, this loss of traditional structures means that individuals
have to constantly build their own life-paths (Giddens, 1991). important for our discussion here is that
ideological, religious or cultural identification of individuals with civil society organisations is no longer
4 See also the discussion in CSI Flanders Working Paper 1 (Oosterlynck, Hertogen, 8 Swerts, 2017)
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self-evident, and new organisations and movements can emerge that are not part ofthe traditional social
order. in Belgium and Flanders, this has been described in research by Huyse (Huyse, 2003), Hellemans
(Hellemans, 1990) and Billiet (Billiet, 2004). in Box 2 we provide a brief discussion of this process of
"(de)pillarisation”.
This loss of stable formal bonds between individuals and organisations does not mean, however, that
collective action has become impossible. For Giddens (1991) politics also includes “life politics” wherein
individuals connect social issues with their own life-project of self-actualisation. Bang and Sorensen
(1999) have described how from this setting the political figure ofthe “everyday maker” can arise, aimed
at political action not in an overarching ideological sense but as part of specific issues in daily life. Again,
we can see here how a described decline of traditional structures is linked to ideas of governance, in this
case through the linkages between individual life-politics and collective political action.
3.1.2 The decentred society
The second idea that is important for our discussion is that of a decentred society — which is related to
the above described decline in traditional structures. in abstract terms this idea has been formulated as
functional differentiation which implies that society is essentially without centre (Esmark, 2009;
Luhmann, 1997, 2013). in this view, society consists of function systems that operate autonomously
from each other. This position reflects two ideas that are influential in many post—traditional theories.
First, that society cannot be analysed as consisting of different ‘parts’ that are integrated in a ‘whole’
(Schinkel, 2007). Second, that no function system (e.g. politics, economy, religion) holds the societal
centre from which an ultimate source of power emanates over all other systems. The implication of this
theory is that the political system can no longer claim to be an integrating function of society. in its most
extreme formulation one could claim that no political system (not even democracy) can include people
into society because there is no society in which to include them. Without claiming an a priori position
towards this claim, we wish to emphasise the link between these ideas and the discussion in governance-
literature on ‘the shift from government to governance“, which we will discuss later. if one were to take
up this theoretical position, this would imply a rethinking of how democratic politics function (e.g.
Schinkel, 2012).
Another influential strand of social theory takes up this idea of a decentred society with the concept of
“networks“ where different actors (individuals, groups, organisations, institutions, ....) can become
important “nodes” and analysis should mainly focus on the relations between the nodes (Marshall 8
Staeheli, 2015). This leads to thinking about “governing processes that are not fully controlled by
governments. Policymaking occurs through interactive forms of governing that involve many actors
from differentspheres" (Lewis, 12/2011, p. 1222). The idea that “networks” are the defining characteristic
of modern society is often attributed to Manuel Castells and his theory of ‘network society‘ (Castells,
2010b), in which governments are only one of many possible actors in the networks to hold significant
influence over power. Although, for the construction of political and cultural identities, according to
Castells the local and regional governments have gained in importance, being "the closest point of
contact between the state and civil society" (Castells, 2010a, p. 334) (which is related to Castells’
distinction between the ‘space of places’ and the ‘space of flows’). Despite this assertion, Castells is more
concerned with the many sources of power and authority in contemporary society, “the nation-state
being just one of these sources." (2010a, p. 356). “Networks” can also be approached very differently,
as can be seen in the explorations in literature on so-called “actor-network theory“ (ANT). ANT as
inspiration for governance theory seems to be taken up especially by researchers on urban planning and
urban governance (Farias 8 Bender, 2010; Rydin 8 Tate, 2016). ANT focusses on the construction of
‘social entities’, most notably the so-called ‘nonhuman actants‘, that other theories generally disregard.
Through the lens of ANT, the city as an object of study “becomes a difficult and decentred object, which
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cannot anymore be taken for granted as a bounded object, specific context or delimited site.” (Farias 8
Bender, 2010, Chapter introduction). ANT is a view on society that turns the network-metaphor inside
out: “Society is not the whole ‘in which’ everything is embedded, but what travels ‘through’ everything,
calibrating connections and offering every entity it reaches some possibility of commensurability."
(Latour, 2005, pp. 241-242). Society, and with it the idea of government and state, becomes
deconstructed, decentred, and finally, as Latour sets out to do, ‘re-assembled’.
A last theory we wish to discuss here is the work of Michel Foucault on ‘governmentality’, which still has
significant impact on the analysis ofthe relationship between government and civil society. (e.g. (Anjaria,
2009; Anwar, 2012; Fyfe, 2005; laeger, 2007; Roy, 2009). Foucault analyses how historically differently
forms of power have developed (e.g. disciplinary power and biopolitics) and how power is not limited to
the institution of government but is at workthroughout society. The governmentality approach highlights
how all kinds of techniques and procedures govern the conduct of actors (Foucault, 2008; Schuilenburg
8 \/an Tuinen, 2009). in a narrow sense, it refers to the forms of knowledge by which a state governs, in
a broader sense this approach emphasises the diffusion of certain ‘rationalities of governing‘ throughout
society. As Dardot and Laval summarise it "[theI term ‘governmentality’ was precisely introduced to
refer to the multiple forms of the activity whereby human beings, who may or may not be members of
a ‘government’, seek to conduct the conduct of other human beings — that is, govern them." (Dardot 8
Laval, 2013, Chapter introduction). Some authors have expressed the idea that ‘neoliberal
governmentality’5 is a dominant force in key domains of our contemporary personal and social lives —
thus affecting all kinds of institutions, such as health care, education, labour, family life, etc. (Bang, 2016;
Dardot 8 Laval, 2013; Triantafillou, 2012). The central idea here is the widespread use and application of
all kinds of techniques of “self-governance“. According to Bang, in a neoliberal society the idea of self-
governance can only succeed in “institutionally altering, modifying or adjusting individual behaviour and
conduct so that it becomes more functional for the system and the variety of institutions that constitute
it." (2016, p.70). in this regard, governmentality research raises questions on whether “life politics“ (see
above) can be capable of overcoming the supposed demise of traditional collective institutions. The
governmentality research leads to insightful explorations of how these power dynamics are capable of
contradicting or undermining the overarching claim of ‘self-governance’ as an expression of freedom
and choice (Dardot 8 Laval, 2013).
These views on the decline of traditional structures and the decentring ofthe state all capture the idea
of a shift in relations ofpower between government and civil society, which in turn is reflected in a shift
in vocabulary in governance literature with concepts as ‘governance’, ‘networks’, ‘trust’ and
‘interdependency’ (Hajer 8 Wagenaar, 2003, p. 1). in the following we will explore this governance
literature more in detail.
5 Furthermore, discussions on Foucault's own position towards neoliberalism still take up considerable space in
the sociological debate. See the very insightful overview of recent discussions on the biog ”An und fur sich"(https://itself.biog/category/foucault/foucault-and-neoliberalism-event/).
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 3.2 Shifting governance?
it has become commonplace to start an overview of governance literature by stating that ‘governance’
is a complex concept which is developed through a large volume of literature that contains many
different approaches to it (Cepiku, 2008; Pollitt 8 Hupe, 2011), and has become so complex and maybe
even overused that it can be hard to see why it is still useful for guiding research (Frederickson, Ferlie,
Lynn, 8 Pollitt, 2007). As Perri 6 has stated, “if governance is everything, maybe it’s nothing" (6, 2015a).
However, whatever the many approaches to the concept, the fact remains that it is an important concept
in the literature on the relationship between government and civil society (Ansell 8 Torfing, 2016; Bevir,
2007,2012; Phillips 8 Smith, 2011) and therefore should be critically engaged with. Even more, we find
the concept still useful for analysing how government and civil society are related vis-a-vis each other
concerning the construction of societal collectively binding decisions and goals. in this manner we wish
to begin our discussion here from a recently renewed effort at formulating a synthetic overview of
academic literature on governance. in the Handbook on Theories of Governance Ansell and Torfing
provide a definition of governance that serves as a useful point of departure for the discussion in this
paper. Governance is defined as
"the interactive processes through which society and the economy are steered towards
collectively negotiated objectives. The crucial insight is that no single actor has the knowledge,
resources and capacities to govern alone in our complex and fragmented societies (...).
interaction is needed in order to exchange or pool the ideas, resources and competences that
are required for the production of desirable outcomes." (Ansell 8 Torfing, 2016, p. 4).
There are many ideas formulated here, and in the following we will unpack these through engaging with
the academic evolution of the concept of governance. in the previous paragraphs we have already
outlined how certain theories of society permeate this definition of governance, specifically theories that
propose the decline of traditional structures and the decentring of state and society. Several
developments in the literature on governance can be identified that take up these ideas. in a review of
the use of governance in public administration literature, Cepiku (2008) identifies how most literature
develops a concept of “governance“ by contrasting it with notions related to ‘government’ and ‘new
public management‘. From a wider perspective, ‘governance’ literature is focused on distinguishing
‘governance’ as a steering mechanism in society that is uniquely different from “hierarchies" and
“markets”. ‘Governance’ has become a response to certain perceived developments in contemporary
society (which we discussed earlier). The literature on governance tries to offer a view on politics and
public service delivery that set outs to be wider and more inclusive than the concept of government
(Pollitt 8 Hupe, 2011). in this discussion the leading distinction seems to be that between ‘governance’
and ‘government’, which can be seen in how much of governance literature focuses more on the process
of governing than on the structure of government (Klijn, 2008). Bevir offers a good summary of these
core ideas of governance:
“Conceptua/ly, governance is less orientated to the state than is government, and it evokes the
conduct of governing at least as much as it does the institutions of government. Temporally,
governance captures changes in government since the latter quarter of the twentieth century."
(Bevir, 2007, p. xxxvii- our emphasis)
Contrary to Bevir’s statement that governance is “less oriented to the state“, we will propose in the
following section of this paragraph that a theory of state is in fact necessary in order to understand how
governance is a useful tool for analysing the relationship between governments and civil society. This is
also reflected in how governance literature has shifted attention given to the role of ‘state’ — an evolution
best described as the development of several ‘conceptual movements’: the move from government to
(network) governance, and the move towards metagovernance and ‘bringing the state back in again’
(Bevir 8 Rhodes, 2010) (Bevir and Rhodes actually conclude with a ‘third wave’ towards decentred
governance which chiefly refers to their own proposal for a renewed, ‘decentred’, governance theory).
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At the hearth of our presentation of governance is the question of whether it is justified to speak of a
shift from hierarchy to markets and networks (Bevir, 2012). First, we will present the basic idea behind
the early literature on ‘the shift from government to governance’. Second, the notion of “differentiated
polity" will be discussed by briefly presenting the ideas of the so-called “Anglo-governance school".
Third, we will then discuss how these ideas are used in a general ‘model’ in public administration, as
presented by Stephen Osborne, which speaks of an evolution from bureaucracy over New Public
Management towards a so-called “New Public Governance” (S. P. Osborne, 2006, 2010). Fourth, we will
briefly discuss how the concept of meta-governance attempts at combining network governance with
the crucial role of government and state in contemporary reflexive modernity. Fifth, we will conclude
this section with three important critiques on governance theory, which will form the basis of for our
discussion of state theory (section 33.) in which we will develop our focus on governance in light of the
relationship between government and civil society.
3.2.1 From government to governance
Central to the discussion here is the aforementioned notion of a “decentred state”, an idea that can of
course only take form if one starts from a previously “centred” state. This is the position from which
most overviews on governance in public administration commence, through presenting ‘the base model‘
of how to steer society: the bureaucratic state (Hondeghem, \/an Dooren, De Rynck, Verschuere, 8 Op
de Beeck, 2013; Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt 8 Bouckaert, 2011; Pyper, 2015).
3.2.1.1 Bureaucracy and hierarchy (Public Administration)
Bureaucracy is a model of organising public policy and service delivery with a focus on predictable rules
(‘rule of law’), a clear hierarchy of competences, a central command structure, and a distinction between
administrators and politicians (Eliassen 8 Sitter, 2008; S. P. Osborne, 2010; Pollitt, 2003) There are two
important characteristics ofthe bureaucratic state that one must not overlook, especially in a European
context. Firstly, the bureaucratic state is a state that carries out its own policies instead of relying on
third party actors for implementation. Secondly, it has historically developed in tandem with the rule of
law, securing both individual rights as well as mechanisms for collective solidarity. in the postwar years
government expansion was built on the social consensus that social problems necessitated active
government intervention (Judt, 2006).
in the bureaucratic state power over politics and public services is firmly situated in the government of
a centralised state. The idealtypical description of a Weberian bureaucracy as a rational process based
on a clear hierarchy of tasks, rules and competences is of course always situated in a complex social
environment. This social complexity is taken up in Gramscian and Foucauldian literature which
emphasise that even in a bureaucratic state governments needs to organise a power base outside of
themselves in civil society (hegemony and domination) and build on specific power-knowledge
connections with other parts of society (governmentality).
3.2.1.2 New Public Management
Starting in the second half of the 20th century, bureaucracy became increasingly evaluated in negative
terms for being sluggish, dysfunctional, overly centralised, and inflexible (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer,
8 Licari, 2012; Pollitt 8 Bouckaert, 2011; Pyper, 2015). (Pollitt (2003) offers a good overview of these
critiques of bureaucracy.) A ‘crisis of the welfare state‘ unfolded as the promise of full employment and
endless economic growth came under scrutiny, the demographic evolution put the pension-system
under pressure, and economic crises disrupted the political balance (ludt, 2006). in a changing
ideological climate government was now seen as the root cause of societal problems while
simultaneously being redeployed as an active instrument for the implementation of the new liberal
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strategies (Dardot 8 Laval, 2013; Wacquant, 2012). Liberal ideology, stemming from “an earlier
generation of pre-Keynesian liberals", had now “re-emerged, vociferous and confident, to blame
endemic economic recession and attendant woes upon ‘big government’ and the dead hand of taxation
and planning that it placed upon national energies and initiative." (ludt, 2006, p. 537). ideologically,
governments were supposed to reduce the collective mechanisms of solidarity and welfare, and instead
emphasise individual responsibilities, autonomous markets, and governmental deregulation.
Privatisation of public services was seen as an answer to bureaucratic inefficiencies — in general the
relations of government with the rest of society preferably relied on competition and contracting.
This ideological shift had a significant impact on public administration and management through the
translation of these ideas into new concepts and policies under the umbrella term “New Public
Management" (NPM) (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, 8 Pettigrew, 1996; Hood, 1991; Metcalfe 8
Richards, 1990; D. Osborne 8 Gaebler, 1992). An important consideration to keep in mind is that this
movement to reform public management reached across the entire political party spectrum, from ‘new
right‘ to ‘socialist left‘. The shared concern in New Public Management is the improvement of the three
“E‘s” of public services: its economy, efficiency and effectiveness. (Eliassen 8 Sitter, 2008; Fattore,
Dubois, 8 Lapenta, 2012; Rhodes, 1994). in a seminal article Christopher Hood (1991) argued that NPM
presented itself as a universally applicable model (across countries, organisations, sectors) and as
politically neutra/— in this way, it is not unlike Public Administration. Hood explicitly approached NPM
as management system that is primarily concerned with the administrative values of frugality and
economy (so-called “sigma” values”) (1991, p. 8) — leading to questions whether NPM could be
reconciled with other values such as equity and security. NPM took aim at the way the bureaucratic
state functioned, proposing alternative techniques and strategies: “contracting out, decentralizing,
granting greater discretion to managers, increasing citizen or customer choices, deregulating, organizing
so that there is competition, and determining effectiveness according to outcome measurement.“
(Frederickson et al., 2012, p. 128).
However important and influential these ideas were, research shows that the actual implementation of
NPM ideas and techniques varies greatly across states. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) compared reforms
in public administration across European and Anglo-Saxon countries and synthesized their findings in
four different strategies (the “4 M’s”). They identified modernising strategies (NPM-style reforms, but
with a strong governmental role), maintaining strategies (safeguarding traditional mechanisms),
mar/<etizing strategies (NPM-style reforms with a larger role for private actors), and minimizing
strategies (minimizing the role of public institutions). These are dynamic concepts in the sense that one
country is not limited to one strategy: elements of these strategies can be found in different degrees
(some more strongly present than others). Strategies also change over time, as well as the speed with
which reforms are implemented; leading to very dynamic view of public administration reform. in their
discussion, Pollitt and Bouckaert point out that despite some differences several European continental
countries can be seen as having “a more positive attitude towards the future role of the state and a less
sweepingly enthusiastic attitude towards the potential contribution ofthe private sector within the public
realm.“ (2011, p. 118). Belgium and other countries that have a strong corporatist tradition of
government are less prone to radical changes in public administration (2011, p. 73)—which points to the
important role of the close interaction between government and civil society in ‘buffering’ the impact of
NPM reforms.
3.2.1.3 Differentiated Polity
Although NPM attacks the state for its flaws it can be argued that it is itselfmostly a top-down strategy
performed by a central government (Fattore et al., 2012), whereby NPM is thus not a complete rejection
of state-led governance but can rather be seen as another form of it (2003; Pyper, 2015). in the early
1990s in the Ul<, however, a train of thought developed in which this movement towards NPM was
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interpreted not as a continuation of state-led governance but as the opposite. According to the so called
“Anglo-governance school” (Bevir 8 Rhodes, 2010; Marinetto, 2003a) or “Differentiated Polity“ model
(Rhodes, 2007) government was becoming increasingly fragmented (Dunleavy 8 Rhodes, 1990; Rhodes
8 Dunleavy, 1995). Rhodes argued that the state was being “hollowed out” (Rhodes, 1994) because of
privatisation and contracting out, increasing use of arms-length public agencies, the transfer of functions
to the EU, and the limitation of public servants’ discretion by NPM techniques (such as performance
measurement, managerial accountability, political control). The hierarchy that was seen as so
characteristically of the bureaucratic state was supposedly giving way to markets and networks.
Especially networks were perceived to be the new dominant organising principle, leading Rhodes to
proclaim that governance should now be understood as networ/< governance (Rhodes, 1996). in sum,
the state was seen to be disintegrating into a patchwork ofself-governing networks as a result of reforms
implemented by that very same state.
in this “Anglo-governance school“, network governance can be summarised “as consisting ofsomething
akin to a differentiated polity characterized by a hollowed—out state, a core executive fumbling to pull
rubber levers of control, and, most notably, a massive growth of networks." (Bevir 8 Rhodes, 2010,
Chapter 5). This notion of “differentiated polity“ has been highly influential in governance theory
(Marinetto, 2003a; Marsh, 2008) and marks the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ in thinking about
the role of government in politics and public service delivery. in this school ofthought the decentring of
the state is the core assumption around which the notion of governance is built.
3.2.2 The rise of networks
Networks are thus the culmination in thinking about the evolution of governance in modern states.
Although there are many different approaches to this concept, it has reached a certain dominant status
in governance literature (Lewis, 12/2011; Sorensen 8 Torfing, 2007). According to Davies and Spicer a
specific interpretation of networks dominates the literature: networks are assumed to ‘fit’ better with
current macro sociological conditions of society (globalisation, decentred society, individualisation, ...);
networks have supposedly expanded in multitude during the last few decades; networks supposedly
operate on the basis of “trust” and are therefore well suited for open, flexible, democratic and ‘better’
governance (2015). Davies and Spicer also link this specific interpretation of ‘network governance’ to
the large body of literature on reflexive modernity and network society that we have discussed earlier
(see 3.1). However, network analysis has a long history in many academic fields and is not easily pinned
down to a singular view. Lewis for example discusses a broad overview of network governance research
that illustrates the wide variety of approaches, using examples of public administration, political science,
sociology, social network analysis, and organisational studies (Lewis, 12/2011). Whatever the specific
approach to networks, the fact that the concept dominates the research on governance is well
established (Bevir, 2012; Bevir 8 Rhodes, 2010; Davies, 2012b).
At this point in the discussion it is useful to look at a schematic for understanding public policy
implementation and public service delivery that has been proposed by Stephen P. Osborne. He has
argued (S. P. Osborne, 2006, 2010) that since the late 19th century up to the start of the 21th century
three ‘idealtypical’ regimes can be distinguished: public administration regime (statist, bureaucratic),
New Public Management (privatisation, managerialism, market-based), and an emergent New Public
Governance (networks, trust, relational contracts). These ‘archetypes’ are an analytical way of pointing
out the changing position of state and civil society, and all three types can coexist with each other or
overlap.
Osborne's evolutionary overview is focused on public policy implementation and public service delivery,
which he declares is “used here to denote the overall field of the design and implementation of public
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policy and the delivery of public services” (2010, p. 1). Although this approach does not include the role
of civil society organisations in politics in its wider meaning (see Box 1: Politics and Service Delivery), it
still covers many dimensions of the relationship between government and civil society. Osborne’s
proposed schematic is thus useful for our discussion not only because of its importance in academic
literature? but also because it succeeds in synthesising the historical development we have presented
above. in Table 1 below the main differences between the different ‘regimes’ or ‘paradigms’? are
presented.
Table 1: Core elements of different governance 'regimes' (S.P. Osborne, 2010, p. 10)
Paradigm / key
elements
Theoretical roots Nature ofthe state Focus Emphasis
Public
Administration
Political science and
public policy
Unitary The political system Policy creation and
implementation
New PublicManagement
Rational/public choice
theory andmanagement studies
Regulatory The organization Management of
organizational resources and
performance
New PublicGovernance
institutional and
network theory
Plural and pluralist The organization in its
environment
Negotiation of values,
meaning and relationships
Resource allocationmechanism Nature of theservice system
Value base
PublicAdministration
Hierarchy Closed Public sector ethos
New PublicManagement
The market and
classical or neo-
classical contracts
Open rational Efficacy of competitionand the marketplace
New PublicGovernance
Networks and relational
contracts Open closed
Dispersed and
contested
As is clear, Public Administration contains those elements we have discussed as ‘the bureaucratic state’.
The core elements of New Public Management in the table can also be understood in light ofour previous
discussion — where we also indicated how NPM contains more elements of hierarchy than many of its
proponents would have liked. We want to focus attention here specifically on "New Public Governance"
(NPG). Osborne’s overview presents a very clear example of how the literature on governance has
come to see “networks” as a new guiding principle of societal steering after markets and hierarchy.
While for some ‘networks’ are then the new ‘dominant’ mode of steering, others approach these modes
more as possible ‘mix’ strategies and institutions (Lowndes, 2001; Pollitt 8 Bouckaert, 2011). Following
Osborne’s reasoning we approach this schematic overview as a ‘cumulative’ evolution, where different
steering principles build on each other and are often at work simultaneously: "lnevitably, such a tripartite
6 The 2006 article metrics show 189 citations via Web of Science, Google Scholar gives 789 citations for the 2006
article and 801 citations for the 2010 book.
7 While Osborne used the term “paradigm” in his 2006 article, he explicitly steps away from this terminology in his
2010 book: ”[PA, NPM and NPG] are then denoted as policy and implementation regimes within this overall field
—thus neatly skirting the above, rather redundant, argument as to whether these regimes are actually paradigmsor not.” (S. P. Osborne, 2010, p. 1). And again a page further down: "lt must be emphasized that this book is notmeant to propose “the NPG” as a new paradigm of public services delivery. it is neither that normative nor thatprescriptive. The question mark in the title is deliberate.” (2010, p. 2).
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regime model is a simplification — elements of each regime can and will coexist with each other or
overlap.” (2010, p. 2). This is represented in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Cumulative evolution of governance regimes
New Public
Governance
New Public
Management
Public Administration
)-‘°’°"’°
New Public Governance is an expression of public administration in light of the aforementioned theories
of “reflexive modernity” and “network society”: "it posits both a plural state, where multiple
interdependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services, and a pluralist state, where multiple
processes inform the policy-making system." (2010, p. 9). The underlying thought is that because of the
fragmented nature of contemporary society, policy making has become a matter of interorganisational
networks through which resources, power, authority and accountability are distributed. This approach
comes close to the idea that collectively binding decisions in society cannot be controlled by a centralised
government but have to be organised through multiple self-governing autonomous social actors of which
government is only one. in its own way, New Public Management was a response to this idea of
decentring as well, by recasting citizens and public administrators in a new role and placing management
and market-type mechanisms at the centre of public service delivery (Radnor, Osborne, 8 Glennon,
2016). New Public Governance is “a broader paradigm that emphasizes both the governance of
interorganizational (and cross-sectoral) relationships and the efficacy of public service delivery systems
rather than discrete public service organizations." (S. P. Osborne, Radnor, 8 Nasi, 2012, p. 135). Where
Public Administration and New Public Management focus on ”administrative processes” and
“interorganisational management” (S. P. Osborne et al., 2012), New Public Governance is framework
for a broader systemic governance. This does not mean that ‘first order’ governing is no longer of
concern, but rather that social complexity demands analyses of second or even third order. We
recognise here some of the concerns taken up by the literature on ‘metagovernance’ (see section 3.2.3
below).
What becomes clear in discussing NPG is that it has the characteristics of what we earlier described as
the ‘narrow’ definition of governance which targets ‘networks’ as the leading coordination principle.
However, Osborne’s scheme in its entirety does point to the necessity of dealing with how
manifestations of different paradigms can be at work simultaneously. Say for instance that organisations
in social work are confronted by a government arrangement that is steering policy by both bureaucratic
procedures as well as NPM-style performance management and public-private governance
partnerships for some projects. What is then the impact on the organisation, on its clients, on the social
workers? How do these different principles of steering function in relation to each other? And how can
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organisations in social work be considered as partners in a network while simultaneously confronted
with bureaucratic realities and NPM-practices and monitoring? Are these mutually exclusive ideas? if
not, what mechanisms are at play through which the involved organisations and actors deal with this
complexity? These questions are key for the research that we will set out to do.
Lowndes (2001) already emphasised how the idea of a shift from government (meaning ’hierarchy’) to
governance (meaning ‘markets’ and ‘networks’) was too simplistic. According to her governance should
be analysed as an increasingly complex “institutional mix” of hierarchies, markets and networks and she
stresses that networks, as “the new ingredient“, should be taken under significant consideration
(Lowndes, 2001, p. 1962). This also reflects our discussion of Osborne’s cumulative evolution of different
governance paradigms in public administration. However, in both Lowndes‘ and Osborne’s view the
network is seen as the main mode of governance — something that Marsh (Marsh, 2008) argues is
characteristic for most governance literature. Both Lowndes‘ and Osborne’s take on governance as an
‘institutional mix’ or ‘cumulative evolution‘ are still important ideas that will return in our own research
model. The main difference is that we will not focus on the ‘network’ as the main mode of governance,
precisely to avoid a prioriprimacy of one the by now canonical three steering mechanisms. Furthermore,
we will argue below (see 3.3.1) that ‘networks’, ‘hierarchies’ and ‘markets’ are theoretically very
different concepts that should not be used on the same level of analysis (6, 2015a). This complexity of
different principles of steering as well as discussions on the position of government in the complex web
of actors, processes and social issues has also been taken up in governance literature with the concept
of ‘metagovernance’, so we will first turn to a brief discussion of this literature.
3.2.3 Metagovernance: the governance of governance
There are numerous authors that disagree with the idea that ‘governance’ necessarily entails a
“hollowed out state”, but instead see government still as an important actor, albeit that it now has a
different role to play: not as a command-and-control centre, but as a coordinating actor in a wider
network. This is what Bevir and Rhodes identify as a so called ‘second wave‘ in governance literature,
focused on metagovernance and a re-evaluation ofthe role ofthe state (Bevir 8 Rhodes, 2010). Sorensen
and Torfing describe it as a ‘second generation‘ in governance literature that has accepted the spread
of governance networks and is now focused on issues such as the conditions of failure and success, the
regulation of governance networks and the democratic quality of networks (Sorensen 8 Torfing, 2005).
in short, metagovernance concerns the ‘governance of governance’.
Metagovernance is another answer to the complexity of governance modes, coupled to a concern for a
renewed steering role for governments. Where the first literature on governance prioritised self-
organising networks at the expense ofthe state, the concept of meta-governance ‘brings the state back
in’: rethinking a role of government so it can still be a relevant and strong actor in politics, public policy
and service delivery. As the ‘governance of governance’ it is concerned with balancing the three ideal
typical modes of governance (hierarchies, markets, networks) — thus focussing on what we described
earlier as the “mix” of governance modes. Metagovernance can best be understood as a higher order
observation of governance. Meuleman summarised these characteristics in a useful working definition
that can serve as a first understanding of metagovernance as an analytical concept:
"Metagovernance is a means by which to produce some degree of coordinated governance,
by designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, market and network
governance, to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those responsible for
the performance of public-sector organisations: public managers as ‘metagovernors’.”
(Meuleman, 2008, p. 68).
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Metagovernance in this sense thus comes close to our understanding of governance in its general
meaning of coordination of collective principles. Meuleman based this definition partly on the works of
Jan Kooiman and Bob lessop, both influential authors in the literature on metagovernance. in general
three schools of thought on metagovernance occur in academic literature (Srzirensen 8 Torfing, 2009),
which we will discuss here. Summarising the literature, Sorensen speaks of three approaches: hands
on, hands off and indirect governance:
"hands on through the facilitation of self-governance; hands off through political, financial,
institutional, and discursive framing of self-governing networks, organizations, and groups; or
indirectly through the presence of a strong shadow of hierarchy.” (in: Bevir,2007, p.230).
The first school of thought focuses on metagovernance as ‘managing of the network’. Crucially, in this
theory networks are seen as self-organising entities, leading to the conclusion that metagovernance can
only work through indirect means of influencing the self-organising capacities of the networks
(Meuleman, 2008). in this theory networks are defined as a complex set of social relations defined in
terms of different expectations, values, competences and resources. in order to prevent network failure,
mechanisms are required that are able to manage this complexity, which is a characteristic specifically
attributed to the state (Lewis, 12/2011). Network management in this regard entails “all the deliberate
strategies aimed at facilitating and guiding the interactions and/or changing the features of the network
with the intent to further the collaboration within the network processes." (l<lijn 8 Koppenjan, 2016, p.
11).
A second school of thought, exemplified by Bob lessop (lessop, 2002, 2016), focuses on how
governance in different systems can be coordinated. The four main modes of governance that Jessop
(2016) identifies are exchange (markets), command (state), dialogue (network), and solidarity (love).
These can be considered the first-order modes of governance which all have their own possibilities of
failure. When failures occur, second-order governance modes try to address these failures by either
focusing on issues with the steering mechanism itself (the different modes) or with the conditions in
which they operate (Jessop, 2016, p. 170). A second-order response to failures in governance can occur
within the first-order institutions (e.g. market expansion in response to lack of profit), but it is the state
that according to Jessop is best suited for “collibration“ (his term for metagovernance): managing the
balance between the different modes of governance in light of society's collectively constructed goals.
Jessop uses Gramscian and Foucauldian literature to argue that metagovernance affects the relations
between different social institutions (state, markets, civil society). Even more, while the state has a
privileged position to engage in metagovernance, its ‘collibrative’ activities often evoke considerable
reaction from competing metagovernance activities (lessop, 2016, p. 177). lessop‘s approach is closely
related to theories that assume a decentred society, and his model places the state in a sort of ‘central
yet displaced’ position: while the state's central position in the social order is disputed, it is somehow the
only domain in society capable of achieving collibrative coordination. Of particular concern for lessop in
the construction of the state's influence and power is the role of hegemonies and governmental
techniques. This approach to the position of government and state is partly the reason why in his earlier
work he emphasised how metagovernance is a process of “muddling through” (lessop, 2002, p. 242),
whereby the state has to rely on processes of persuasion and its influence in the construction of collective
intelligence as much as on its control over money, finance and law.
A third approach to metagovernance, developed by Kooiman (2003) presents a systems-theoretical
perspective on metagovernance. Kooiman takes a decisively normative approach, starting from the
position that metagovernance concerns “governing how to govern” (2003, p. 188). Governance in the
first order is concerned with the way “governing actors try to tackle problems or create opportunities on
a day-to-day basis” (2003, p. 135). This social construction of problems and solutions are in their turn
embedded in "institutional settings”, which are governed in a second-order mode of governance (2003,
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p. 153). First-order governance is concerned with how problems and solutions are constructed and the
mechanisms social systems have to reduce the complexity of this process. Second-order governance is
concerned with maintaining an overview on how institutions (such as state, civil society and market)
facilitate or limit the possibilities for the construction of problems and solutions. Metagovernance is then
a third-order form of governance that deals with “normative governance issues” (2003, p. 170). Kooiman
argues that this third order is not a higher order as such, but that it is an added normative dimension
from which to reflect upon the whole: "Meta governing is like an imaginary governor, teleported to a
point ‘outside’ and holding the whole governance experience against a normative light.” (2003, p. 170).
Kooiman also emphasises that it is through metagovernance that the use of norms for reflecting on the
different orders of governance are always susceptible to debate by those governed. This ‘meta’
reflexivity is an inherent aspect of his take on metagovernance.
These three theories all build on the notion of a decentred society in which government is no longer the
central control centre, but still is the only domain in society from which collective coordination can be
achieved. They thus look for ways in which government can still play a vital role in securing some form
of control over collective societal goals and strategies, despite its displaced position in society. Overall,
in metagovernance the preferred tactics are related to persuasive negotiation and other informal
relations (Bevir 8 Rhodes, 2010). However, Davies (Davies, 2011a, 2011b) rightly argues that the state
still has more coercive measures as its disposal. Sorensen’s indication (quoted above) of the shadow of
hierarchy points of course to Scharpf‘s analysis of how self-organising organisations operate “in the
shadow of the state“, i.e. in the hierarchically determined framework set out by government (Scharpf,
1997). This shadow of hierarchy already contains the coercive powers at the disposal of governments,
although at times in governance literature it seems to remain too much in the analytical shadows
(Davies, 2011a, 2014a). Coercive measures taken by governments can of course also occur much more
directly, as for example in the use of police force in reaction to the early protests by the so-called
‘lndignados’ in Spain, or in the forceful deportation of undocumented immigrants. Despite the fact that
government can still rely on forms of coercive power in politics and public service delivery,
metagovernance literature emphasises that its default position is that of coordination and persuasion.
in his extensive critique on network governance, Jonathan Davies claims that for those adopting the
theory of ‘network governance’ “Metagovernance (the network governance of network governance) is
the least-worst, necessarily imperfect, governmental solution to social complexity.” (Davies, 2011a,
Chapter 1). Davies argues that metagovernance is another form of ‘network governance‘, and in light of
our previous discussion we agree with this assertion. Metagovernance is built on concepts that are well
attuned to the theory of the reflexive modernity wherein individual and collective actors are able to act
reflexively on their position in fast-expanding social networks, as well as to the idea of a network society
in governing power is dispersed through these networks. This does not make the idea of
metagovernance invalid, but it does make it susceptible to the critiques on ‘network governance’ which
we will discuss in the section below.
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3.3 Three critiques on ‘governance’ and ‘network governance’
We have argued that governance chiefly refers to the process of constructing collectively negotiated
objectives in the interaction between different social spheres or systems, such as politics, economy and
civil society. in this section we wish to present some important critiques on the dominant position of
‘networks’ in the current governance debate, as well as on the use of hierarchies, markets and networks
as the main ‘modes of governance’ in governance literature. First of all, we will clarify some conceptual
misunderstandings in the debate on networks, hierarchies and markets. Our main critique here is that
these concepts refer to different levels of analysis and one should be careful to consider them as distinct
‘modes of governance‘. Perri 6's recent discussion (6, 2015a) on bureaucracies and networks will be a
key source for our discussion. Secondly, the claim of a ‘historical’ shift towards ‘network governance’
does not fit with the actual historical developments of European states. We do not wish to dismiss the
qualities of networks as a useful concept for analysis, but we do wish to highlight some important
critiques on the dominance of network governance. in this way we want to “put networks in their place”
(Davies 8 Spicer, 2015), and bring the complex interplay between different institutions to the forefront.
Lastly, ‘network governance‘ is often built on underlying normative assumptions that should be
considered carefully. Specifically we will briefly discuss Jonathan Davies‘ argument that network
governance has a strong neoliberal bias (Davies, 2012a, 2012b; Davies 8 Spicer, 2015).
3.3.1 Conceptual critique on the ‘displacement of hierarchies‘
Our first critique starts from the central claim in ‘network governance’ literature that networks have
displaced hierarchies as the dominant institutional form. Even Bevir by now admits that this claim was
overly dramatic: “hierarchic bureaucracies are still the dominant form of public governance” (Bevir,
2012, Chapter 4). Bell and Hindmoor argue that “states have not been hollowed out and the exercise of
state authority remains central to most governance strategies” (Bell 8 Hindmoor, 2009, pp. 1—2). They
present a wide overview of cases of hierarchical governance by governments (2009, pp. 71—92). For
instance, despite the influence of the logic of privatisation, state-owned enterprises are still numerous in
several countries and even where privatisation has occurred it has been accompanied by an extension
of regulatory powers (2009, p. 75). in relation to many civil society organisations governments rely on
extensive auditing procedures, further strengthening the argument that hierarchies are widely important
(2009, p. 76). Arguing against the claims made by the UK—centred ‘differentiated polity’ school (see
3.3.1), Perri 6 states that in the UK hierarchy was still very strong in the same period that this school of
thought developed its claims on a ‘hollowed out‘ state and dominant ‘network governance‘ (6, 2015a, p.
61). Davies (2000) also found that in the period between 1992-97 hierarchies and markets were still
prevalent in UK local governments. Furthermore, Perri 6 argues that from the immediate postwar years
up to the early 1970's UK governments were frequently engaged in negotiations with trade unions,
limiting the hierarchical powers of government through network strategies and tactics — thus before
networks were considered to be important governance modes. (6, 2015a, pp. 61—62).
Bouckaert argues that at the turn ofthe 21th century New Public Governance consisted of a combination
of network and hierarchical governance (Meuleman, 2008) —as we have seen Osborne also places NPG
in a continuing cumulative evolution of ‘governance modes’ (see 3.2.2). This is not to say that hierarchies
are still operating in the same way as in the immediate postwar period and that states have not
undergone any reforms. After considering several programs of ‘modernisation’ reforms in European and
Anglo-Saxon countries, Bouckaert and Pollitt (see also earlier 3.2.1.2) propose that for some (mainly
European continental) states the model of ”neo-Weberian state” (NWS) could be a better model for
showing how hierarchies are impacted by recent reform movements: "ln essence, INWSI was an
attempt to modernize traditional bureaucracy by making it more professional, efficient, and citizen-
friendly.” (Pollitt 8 Bouckaert, 2011, p. 19). NWS is thus a model wherein government systems operate
with hierarchical principles combined with certain standards of professional capacities, efficient
management and the consultation of external actors (civil society, market actors, ...). Furthermore, we
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argue that this NWS-model also leaves room for the possibility of a coercive state power — from an
optimistic perspective as a guarantee for collective solidarity or individual liberties; from a pessimistic
perspective as a safeguard for specific elite interests.
When comparing NWS to NPG and NPM (as Pollitt and Bouckaert define them) it becomes clear these
models do not operate through an exclusive ‘mode of governance’: NPM does not exclusively operate
through markets, NPG not exclusively via networks, and NWS is not an exclusively hierarchical affair
(Pollitt 8 Bouckaert, 2011). Contracts and marketisation can be pushed through by hierarchical
authorities; networking partnerships can be established by centralised regulators and incorporate
varying contractual agreements; hierarchies themselves often rely on informal networks and trust in
order to achieve policy goals. Accordingly, the empirical reality of national governments cannot be
simplified by assigning each government to a single model. Distinct policy domains might be in some
regards attributed to a certain model, but the overall view ofthe public sector is a messy complex reality
(Pollitt 8 Bouckaert, 2011). Again, the nuanced and complex mix of governance modes and institutions
comes into view, on a conceptual level (models themselves are mixed) as well as the empirical level
(reality is not a model).
Furthermore, the idea that networks have displaced hierarchies also implies that ‘markets’ have not
managed to take over the role that hierarchies once had — as was claimed by New Public Management
literature and the accompanying liberal political ideologies. As we have seen in an earlier section of the
paper (see 3.2.1), markets were believed by many to be the answer to bureaucracy’s failings and the
‘crisis of the welfare state‘. However, hierarchical intervention often occurs when confronted with
market failures, such as in the management of scarce resources, public health and social security (Bell
8 Hindmoor, 2009, pp. 79-80). The "shadow of hierarchy” also points to the fact that many forms of
‘privatisation’ are acted out under state oversight and control. They key issue is that these marketisation
strategies and NPM-policies have been designed, implanted and controlled by governments, positioned
under its ‘shadow of hierarchy‘. Bell and Hindmoor refer to Moran who states that the current
hierarchical modern state is "characterised by stronger central controls, and extensive auditing and
quantitative measurement of performance” (2009, pp. 88-89). This last claim is also supported by Perri
6, who cites the rise of new regulatory agencies in the UK that are constantly monitoring and assessing
the delivery of public services (6, 2015a).
Perri 6 argues that claims about the displacement of hierarchies stem from a “theoretical
misunderstanding of hierarchy” (2015a, p. 58). Hierarchies have often been confused with bureaucracies
and coercion-based governing, while instead they are essentially rule-based systems and as such they
can be coercive or bureaucratic but not necessarily so. He argues that hierarchy is an “ordered division
of labour”, a distinct institutional form based on integrating values, norms, roles and expectations more
than that it‘s based on domination and control (2015a, p. 67). Consequently hierarchies can manifest
itself in many different ways and should not be reduced to instances of commands and control.
Hierarchical systems, according to this view, can function without issuing many commands or
establishing strict control procedures.
Furthermore, Perri 6 argues that hierarchies, markets and networks are analytical concepts of a different
order. Whereas a hierarchy is a distinct institutional form in this view, “markets” are empirical
descriptions of any event of exchange, which can thus occur in different institutional forms (2015a, p.
69). Markets are events of exchange between buyers and providers and can thus manifest as well in,
among others, hierarchical settings. Consider for example the prolific use of government contracting of
services and goods, “to the point that government procurement across the range of domestic public
services is as hierarchical as it has ever been and probably more than it used to be, even in defence
procurement during the great wars of the twentieth century” (2015a, p. 70). He makes the similar
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argument that “networks” are not a distinct institutional form. As opposed to markets they are not
‘empirical events’, but are an analytical tool for describing events in which nodes are related in sets of
ties (2015a, p. 70). Consequently networks are not exclusively tied to organising principles as ‘trust’ or
‘self-organisation’ — these principles can be very well at work in hierarchies as well as in markets.
According to Perri 6 this theoretical misunderstanding between the concepts thus undermines any
claims of a historical shift (see also our discussion in section 3.3.2) which in turn leads him to dismiss the
notion of metagovernance as irrelevant (2015a, p. 71).
6 has written several articles in which he explores an alternative framework for analysing the institutional
diversity of governing, which he builds on an Neo-Durkheimian institutional framework (6, 2014, 2015b,
2016). Using Durkheim’s concepts of social integration and regulation he proposes different types of
institutional settings in which policy decisions take place (6, 2014), whereby each institutional form
functions as a ‘horizon’ of possibilities and constraints in which decision-making takes place. While these
articles offer a coherent theoretical framework to replace the conceptual inconsistencies of the
‘hierarchy-market-network’ thinking, they focus primarily on the internal processes of government
based on historical cases in the British core executive and administration.
For our research, we take 6’s critiques into consideration while staying focused on the relationship
between government and civil society. in the following section (3.4) we will therefore present a
Gramscian-inspired view on the state, which emphasis how the relationship between government and
civil society is formed by a continuous struggle of social forces throughout different institutional settings
— thus also avoiding the fallacy of assigning certain normative imperatives to specific institutions. This
does not mean that ‘networks’, ‘markets’ and ‘hierarchies’ become irrelevant concepts, but they are not
considered the main modes of governance. instead, the analysis of how governance arrangements are
contextually is our focus of attention. in this regard, network analysis can still offer important insights,
for example in analysing the role of informal practices in settings with a formalised division of labour.
3.3.2 Historical confusion
Our second critique is aimed at the claim of a ‘historical shift’ from hierarchical governance towards
network governance, and follows from the insight that governance through networks is not a new
phenomenon in the context of European welfare states. The idea that states have mostly relied on
‘hierarchies’ before networks came along rests on two fundamental confusions. First, as we have
discussed above, the distinction between the three ‘modes’ is theoretically inconsistent. Secondly, this
idea ignores significant parts ofthe historical reality of politics and public policy —some ofwhich we have
already discussed in our first critique (as argued by Bell 8 Hindmoor (2009), Davies (2011a) and Perri 6
(2015a)). Many historians also point out that as far back as the Roman Empire networks between state
and private actors shaped important domains ofthe state (6, 2015a), such as the grain trade (e.g. Kessler
and Temin (2007) argue that private merchants actively used their connections with state actors to
ensure large-scale grain imports) or in organising tax and toll road collections (as Forrer et al. (2010)
point out in their discussion of public-private partnerships).
Beyond public-private partnerships, network-based interactions between government and civil society
also have a long history in European countries — certainly in the case of corporatist traditions as for
example in countries such Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria (Bode, 2011; Evers 8
Laville, 2005; Pierre, 1999). in his study on elderly care in Germany, France and England Bode finds that
"inter-agency collaboration as such is nothing new in this field so that viewing (colgovernance as a
substitute for hierarchical government or market governance does not make sense here” (Bode, 2006,
p. 551- our emphasis) Furthermore, considering the possible expanding role of market—driven reforms
in public services and the non-profit sector, the so-called dominance of networks has even less empirical
footing. Bode argues that this is precisely what is occurring internationally in welfare policy and health
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care (Bode, 2011). Moreover, in light of the previously discussed distinction between markets as
empirical settings and networks as analytical tools, it is not hard to see how networks are not a priori
free from profit motives or market—type governance techniques. Networks and markets are not new
phenomena — so analysis ofthe changes indicated by Bode should focus on how profit-driven exchange
institutions can become the norm in public policy, and not whether these changes should be categorised
as ‘markets’ or ‘networks’.
Not only in service delivery but also in the field of politics and policy-making governments have since
long actively engaged with nongovernmental actors. A clear example is the governance of labour policy
through dialogue and negotiations between labour unions, business associations and governments
(Cantillon, 2016) — long established in many countries. in broader terms, many European welfare states
have historically developed through the socio-political integration of government and nongovernmental
actors. Specifically for Belgium, and especially from early 20th century up to the 1960's, this integration
took shape in strong "pillars": vertical integration of organisations along certain societal fault lines,
leading to a compartmentalised society, whereby individual member’s lives are taken up from "the
cradle to the grave” (Hellemans, 1990, p. 26) (see Box 2 below). A crucial element in this process is the
close integration of political parties (and the political elite) with these pillars (Billiet, 2004). These pillars
were resilient institutions, since during times of the decline traditional structures (among others due to
individualisation and secularisation — see 3.1.1) pillars still functioned as strong institutions mediating
between the political system and civil society organisations — despite the fact that individual citizens
were no longer as tightly integrated into the pillars as before. This has been described in terms of a
transformation from “pillars" to "political concerns" (Huyse, 2003) or "neo-pillars" (Hellemans, 1990).
The result was a state system in which political power was organised through a complex institutional
setting, wherein these ’neo-pillars‘, via political parties and elite networks, took up a key institutional
position between governments and civil society. in short, from its inception the Belgian state has
developed around the historically altering integration of government and civil society interaction. Again,
we propose that a Gramscian inspired framework fits better with the historical developments of the
governance arrangements between these complex institutions.
Box 2: History of pillarisation in Belgium
Civil society organisations have been closely integrated in the development of the welfare state in Belgium,
which is most notably described as the ‘pillarisation’ of Belgian society. A “pillar” is a strong coupling between
civil society organisations, political parties and government representatives that is constructed around
shared values or interests. (Billiet, 2004; Huyse, 2003). The Belgian state has historically evolved around the
evolution of three societal ‘fault lines’: religious—ideological (clerical vs. anticlerical), socio-economic (labour
vs. capital) and ethno-linguistic (Flemish vs. Walloon) (Devos, 2016; Dewachter, 2001; Huyse, 2003; Witte
et al., 2009). Around these fault lines networks of organisations have evolved, ranging from organised labour
and employers’ organisations to cultural organisations, schools and universities, media (especially
newspapers) and banks (Devos, 2016). Pillarisation is then a vertical integration ofthese organisations along
certain societal fault lines, leading to a compartmentalised society, whereby individual member’s lives are
taken up from "the cradle to the grave” (Hellemans, 1990, p. 26): “Pillars spanned the whole person. One
was born in this ‘world’ (e..g in a catholic maternity) and a large part of life took place within the confines of
the same pillars: school, youth movement, hospital, mutuality, sport association, cultural association, labour
union, library, health care at home, elderly associations, political parties, were organised on a
philosophical-religious ground. Contact with dissentients was minimal.” (Huyse, 2003, p. 41- ourtranslation).
The key element here is the close integration of political parties (and the political elite) with civil society
organisations (Billiet, 2004). in Belgium three ‘pillars’ (a christian-democratic, a socialist and a smaller liberal
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pillar) organised the state, especially in the period 1930-1960 (Huyse, 2003). The roots of pillarisation can be
traced to much earlier in the development of the Belgian state, as Billiet states: “Pillarisation is a structural
alternative for the failure of the catholic majority to keep control over societal life under a regime of
separation of Church and State” (2004, p. 133- our translation). Thus, the catholic pillar originally occupied a
position as a private initiative outside of governmental control. However, gradually, and with the rise of other
social pillars, this position gave way to a position whereby the state would provide financial and structural
support for these initiatives (in education, culture, health care, ...) in return for a ‘contained’ social conflict
(Huyse, 2003). The power dynamic between different social groups resulted in a state system that was
particularly adapted at containing social conflicts in these pillars, more than solving the specific policy issues
at hand (van den Buick, 1992). it is important here to remember that the underlying social fault lines ran
through these pillars, connecting members across different social positions: "lt means that potential enemies
were confronted with one another within each pillar, a situation that led to more moderation” (Witte et al.,
2009, p. 414). Thus, the crucial issue is not that conflict did not occur (in or between pillars), but how conflict
was managed by a state system that could selectively deal with social issues, never confronting all three
fault lines at once, resulting in a balancing and stabilising state hegemony.
Starting from the 1960’s however, these social pillars evolved towards a new position of power. Gradually,
organisations became more entrenched inside the political system by positioning more and more of their
members in parliament, ministerial cabinets and government administration (Witte et al., 2009, p. 414).
According to Huyse the primary characteristics of the pillars that were constructed around philosophical
differences and social closure disappeared. These gave way to the dominance of their, until then, secondary
characteristics, of which the most notable was the central position of pillars in the state (2003, p. 375). Pillars
thus became ‘political concerns’ (Huyse, 2003) or “neo-pillars” (Hellemans, 1990): integrated professional
networks of organisations (political parties and civil society organisations), occupying key positions in the
institutions of the state. As such the Belgian state became characterised by a highly professionalised civil
society (through the yearlong structural support of government) and a government that is tightly connected
to civil society organisations and networked political parties (Hellemans, 1990).
This integrated organisational network explained why these ‘neo-pillars’ could survive in a period of
increasing secularisation and individualisation. While at the level of the organisations‘ elite the coupling with
specific political parties remained strong, this was not the case at the level of the individual members. The
members’ connection with the ‘pillar’ was shifting from an exclusive, sustainable and formal membership to
a set ofselective, changing and informal connections with different organisations (Billiet, 2004). An important
part of this evolution was the expansion of the identity of the ‘pillars’ towards less strictly defined values
(from ‘catholic’ to ‘Christian’, or from ‘truth’ to ‘value’). More and more the ‘service’ and ‘quality’ of the
organisations were being touted instead of their philosophical identity, with more focus on professional
integration than on the integration of its ”clients” (Billiet, 2004; Hellemans, 1990). Duringthe 1980's and early
1990’s the position of these civil society organisations in the state system became increasingly evaluated in
negative terms because of their clientelism, their pre-occupation of state power, and their lack of openness
towards other organisations or social actors (Billiet, 2004; Huyse, 2003). in 1995 this lead to a report in the
Flemish parliament by a “task force De-pillarisation”, stating the goal of “reducing the party—political and
philosophical pillarisation” (Vlaamse Raad, 1995, p. 127).
At the same time however, extreme-right politics in Flanders was on the rise, and in academic literature
part of the problem was identified as lack of “social capital“. in Flanders, this lead to a reframing of the role
civil society: no longer as ‘political concerns’ occupying state power, but as praised social actors providing
society with the necessary means for restoring social capital (Billiet, 2004). Symbolic for this reframing of its
role was the coining of the term “middenveld” (“midfield”) instead of “pillars” for the many ‘networked’
organisations that were deemed suitable to take up this role.
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 3.3.3 Normative pitfalls of network governance
A third critique considers the possible ideological and normative bias in models of‘network governance’.
in her review of the governance concept in public administration literature, Cepiku finds that there is
often confusion in international literature between the normative and analytical dimensions of
‘governance’, and that more attention should be given to separating the two (Cepiku, 2008, p. 110). One
bias that can often be found is the equation of governance with the idea of a ‘retreating’ government: a
government with less influence than before, either as a deliberate political strategy or as a consequence
of contemporary societal complexity. The ‘retreat’ of government is often framed as ‘neoliberalism’
whereby government gives way to market forces. However, neoliberalism should not be considered as
a simple retreat of government from society, but as the active redeployment of the state in reforming
society according to principles of the market and security (Dardot 8 Laval, 2013; Wacquant, 2012) (This
critique on ‘neoliberalism’ occurs quite frequently in critical articles on governance (see also 3.1 and
3.4.2); we find it therefore useful to add a brief discussion of the main characteristics of “neoliberalism"
in Box 3 below).
Jonathan Davies(2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2014b; Davies 8 Spicer, 2015) has been especially critical
of ‘network governance’ literature, linking the centrality of ‘networks’ in the literature on governance to
neoliberal ideology. Building on insights from Boltanski and Chiapello, he argues that ‘networks’ are a
crucial part of the neoliberal hegemony in the age of informational capitalism where the "connectionist
paradigm” and the "citizen-entrepreneur” is celebrated and legitimised (Davies, 2011b). On the level of
local policies, some authors connect this network ideology with the spread of competitive development
strategies aimed at the facilitation of economic growth and the flow of capital (Peck, 2002)— as for
example in Harvey’s work on the “entrepreneurial city” (Harvey, 1989). Davies’ critique on the network
model is focused on the role it plays in the construction of the ‘neoliberal hegemony‘ in informational
capitalism. He therefore develops a Gramscian framework of analysis to argue that networks have
become the dominant paradigm across the political spectrum — which he discusses in the context of
urban governance in the UK. This neoliberal paradigm as Davies sees it entails a belief in the inherently
positive force of networks which through both competition and cohesion shall lead to ‘inclusive’
governance. Davies then argues that as a hegemonic strategy these governing networks eventually
almost always fall short, often resulting in the reestablishing of coercive hierarchies to ensure hegemonic
integration (Davies, 2011a). This brings us then to the supposed link between networks and
neoliberalism. Davies argues that in neoliberal society hierarchies take over where networks fail in order
to ensure the hegemonic consensus, proving at once that hierarchies were never gone to begin with
and that networks are mostly ideological vehicles (2011a). We argue that this is a clear example of the
conceptual confusion we pointed out above. Hierarchies can be coercive, but are not necessarily so —
and hierarchies can integrate elements ofexchange and profit (markets) as well as function in networked
settings. Our view is that Davies observes governance arrangements too much in terms of a tension
between hierarchy (coercion, domination) and networks (hegemony, ideology). We argue instead that
focussing on how contextually situated institutions interact with each other offers more analytical
flexibility than focussing on predetermined modes of governance. To use Davies‘ own words in one his
later articles: instead of “fetishizing“ any particular form of governance, “a more agnostic approach to
governance research” should be adopted (Davies 8 Spicer, 2015).
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Box 3: Neoliberalism?
in the literature on governance several authors have argued that contemporary society can be characterised
as ‘neoliberal’, if not in its totality than certainly in many areas of politics and social and economic policy
(Bang, 2016; Bevir, 2011; Dardot 8 Laval, 2013; Davies, 2011a, 2014b; Geddes, 2005, 2006; llcan, 2009;
Jessop, 2002; Lang 8 Rothenberg, 2016; Perkins, 2009; Wacquant, 2012; Williams, Cloke, 8 Thomas, 2012)
When reading the rich literature on neoliberalism one is faced with the complexity of the topic and the
multitude of different approaches. As is the case with ‘governance’ and other concepts, the term
‘neoliberalism’ has been defined in different ways and as such has given rise to a large debate on what it
actually is (Dean, 2014). Here, we do not wish to present this debate, but instead present an approach to
‘neoliberalism’ that is most suited for the analysis of governance in this paper.
it is through the concept of governmentality that research on governance and neoliberalism has been most
successfully developed. As Bevir notes, governance and governmentality both share a common concern:
"(...) they disaggregate the state, drawing attention to the diffusion of political power and political action, and
exploring the porosity of the border between state and civil society.” (Bevir, 2011, p. 457). The concept of
governmentality has been used to describe a certain set of techniques, practices and knowledge (what
Foucault called dispositifs) that are so widespread in society that it is possible to speak of a ‘neoliberal
governmentality’. Central to these ideas is that neoliberalism constitutes a form of ‘self-governance’ by
which competition becomes the norm in all aspects of personal and social life, and personal freedom can
only be appreciated through an ‘entrepreneurial’ approach towards life (Bang, 2016; Dardot 8 Laval, 2013).
Crucial in these approaches is that neoliberal governmentality is considered to be a “global” rationality: “By
this we mean that such a rationality is global in the two senses of the term: it is ‘world-wide’ in that it obtains
on a world scale; and, far from being confined to the economic sphere, it tends to totalize —that is, create a
world in its own image through its power to integrate all dimensions of human existence.” (Dardot 8 Laval,2013, p. 11).
Neoliberalism is thus more than an economic project of laissez—faire or capital accumulation, but it is
considered a deeply political set of beliefs and strategies that impacts all aspects of life: “IThe institutional
core of neoliberalism] consists of an articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to
impose the stamp of the second onto the third.“ (Wacquant, 2012, p. 71). Neoliberalism should not be
equated with the ‘retreat’ or ‘diminishing’ of the state, but rather it concerns how the state is an active
mechanism in strengthening the reach of neoliberal ideas and strategies. The exact nature ofthese changes
can vary with the concerns and focus of the authors. For example, Wacquant (2012) emphasises the
penalising and disciplining aspects of neoliberalism, Bang (2016)illustrates how sets of institutions can
‘empower’ or ‘nudge’ individuals into doing what is most suited to the societal equilibrium, while Davies
(2014b) focuses on how neoliberalism is closely connected to the coercive power of the local state.
 33 
 
 
3.4 State theory: government, governance and governmentality
We have shown how the concept of governance captures the dynamic between government and other
social spheres, among which civil society, concerning the construction of societally collective goals. in
the literature, as we have shown, some authors have claimed that governance has come to mean
‘network governance’ — a claim that we have criticised in the previous section. in order to analyse the
relationship between government and civil society it is important to answer these critiques and present
a framework that captures the continuous struggle of social forces throughout different institutional
settings —thus also avoiding the fallacy of normative assumptions regarding specific institutions. We will
therefore present a Gramscian-inspired framework which integrates government and civil society in the
construction of ‘the state‘. A key insight in this perspective is that this close integration of government
and civil society in the state emerges through the construction of concrete institutions — it is not an
abstract process but one that become visible in the institutions of social and political life. Consequently,
the specific institutions on which this integration is built becomes the focus of attention. in our research
we will focus on specific governance arrangements around defined socially constructed issues or policy
domains. in this framework governance arrangements are the concrete manifestations of hegemonic
processes around socially constructed issues or policy domains.
At this point it is important to emphasise that this paper distinguishes between the analytical tools
developed in the work of these authors and the large literature commenting on it, from the ideological
assumptions of some authors working with these concepts. Specifically we are referring to the tendency
to regard ‘civil society’ as a positive, progressive force and ‘government’as a negative, limiting force in
society. A good counterexample of this tendency is Buttigieg’s discussion of the rise of the American
religious-conservative movement (Buttigieg, 2005). Moreover, while not always explicit, this underlying
assumption is reflected in the attention given to the internal differentiation of civil society without doing
the same for government (e.g. Agustin 8 lorgensen (2016)). in the following, we will argue that in order
to understand the hegemonic dynamics between government and civil society we must avoid a
homogenous view of government and civil society and construct a framework that captures both
spheres as internally complex differentiated realities. Earlier, we have already outlined the central
dimensions ofthis complexity (see: 2 I internal differentiation of government and civil society).
in the following section we will briefly explore the well-known thesis of the integral state developed by
Antonio Gramsci. This will, firstly, allow us to understand how in general terms collectively binding
decisions are always set in a social struggle of forces, related to certain positions and interests.
Secondly, we will use the notion of hegemony and domination to point to the mutual roles of both
government and civil society in governance processes.
3.4.1 Hegemony and domination
in this paragraph we now present the Gramscian argument that even a bureaucratic government needs
to organise its power base outside of itself in civil society, in a relationship that Gramsci called
"hegemony". The same applies for the other models of governance that we have discussed, be it
steering by markets, networks or some form of higher order steering: the fundamental power dynamics
between government and civil society are the heart of Gramsci‘s analysis. Of course, Gramsci‘s claims
are made in a different time, a different state and comes with a specific concern for ‘class struggle‘ and
the ‘subaltern’. However, the fundamental insights from Gramsci can still guide us for a general
understanding of the role of government and civil society in contemporary states, as we will show.
Gramsci‘s ideas have been taken up by a large body of literature contextualising his ideas for
contemporary society (Agustin 8 lrzirgensen, 2016; Davies, 2012a; Jessop, 1997; Laclau 8 Mouffe, 2014)
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in Gramsci‘s view government and civil society are both part ofthe state. Analytically he separates them
in order to investigate more clearly the dynamic of power between them, as Gramsci-scholar Joseph
Buttigieg notes:
"Gramsci regarded civil society as an integral part of the state; in his view, civil society, far
from being inimical to the state, is, in fact, its most resilient constitutive element, even though
the most immediately visible aspect of the state is political society, with which it is all too often
mistakenly identified. He was also convinced that the intricate, organic relationships between
civil society and political society enable certain strata of society not only to gain dominance
within the state but also, and more importantly, to maintain it, perpetuating the subalternity of
other strata." (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 4) - our emphasis.
Political society here refers to ‘government’ in a broad sense, or the ‘state’ in a narrow sense: the
executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the police, administrative systems, etc. (Buttigieg, 1995, 2005;
Simon, 1991). in terms of power, government is the sphere of coercion which can force people to act
according to a set of rules and norms either by direct violence or by the implicit threat of violence. This
is of course the classic understanding of ‘monopoly of violence‘ or monopoly of coercion. Gramsci‘s goal
was to understand how political power in modern liberal societies is distributed (Buttigieg, 2009) and the
use of coercive power is not enough to explain this. it is in civil society that a more stable base for power
is constructed on the basis of hegemony. (Buttigieg, 1995). Consequently Gramsci writes: “State :
political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci,
2006, p. 80).
One of the key issues in which we follow a more neo-Gramscian approach, is Gramsci‘s concern for
class struggle which shapes his thoughts concerning the important role of the ‘ruling classes‘, ‘the
subaltern‘, the ‘domination’ ofthe state and most notably the ‘war of position’ (Gramsci, 2006). The state
for him refers to mechanisms of political power in government and civil society that are deeply
connected with a corresponding economic base (Coutinho 8 Sette-Camara, 2012; Laclau 8 Mouffe,
2014). in contemporary analyses this Gramscian formulation of the state is not bound to the idea of a
‘class project’ (Hall, 1986; Laclau 8 Mouffe, 2014), but can be related to different forms of social
domination and hegemony, such as “gender, ethnicity, 'race‘, generation, religion, political alignment, or
regional location“ (lessop, 2016, p. 59). Gramscian theory of hegemony can very well "[acceptl social
complexity as the very condition of political struggle and (...) [set] the basis for a democratic practice of
politics, compatible with a plurality of historical subjects" (Laclau 8 Mouffe, 2014, pp. 105-106). Laclau
and Mouffe argue that it is Gramsci‘s growing concern with the ‘intellectual and moral’ dimensions of
hegemony that creates this room for expansion beyond ‘class’ (even though Gramsci himself in the end
remained within the boundaries of the ‘class project‘): ”lt is in this movement, from the ‘political’ to the
‘intellectual and moral’ plane, that the decisive transition takes place towards a concept of hegemony
beyond ‘class alliances” (Laclau 8 Mouffe, 2014, pp. 103-105). This is however only part ofthe analysis,
since one of the key aspects in this theory of hegemony is the fundamental role of institutions and
organisations, more than an abstract struggle of ideas: hegemony concerns the establishment of
dominant ideology and institutions through leadership and consensus (Buttigieg, 1995, 2009). A good
historical example of such institution building is discussed in Box 2: History of pillarisation in Belgium.
To be sure, hegemony should thus not be understood as a conspiracy or a preconceived strategy for
social domination by a certain class or group, but as a set of existing social relations that are more
beneficial to specific social actors than others. A social order is the outcome of the forces at play in
society, ofthe dynamic between coercion and hegemony, that is not simply ‘controlled’ by a social class
(Simon, 1991). These social groups then ‘exercise’ hegemonic power in the sense that through their
participation in certain institutions and organisations they reproduce the existing social order. This is a
crucial insight in Gramsci‘s writings: "ldeology is not identified with a ‘system of ideas‘ or with the ‘false
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consciousness’ of social agents; it is instead an organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions
and apparatuses, which welds together a historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles"
(Laclau 8 Mouffe, 2014, pp. 103-105). Thus, from Gramsci we take the concern for the hegemonic
relation between government and civil society not as a concern for an abstract system of ideas but as a
concern for the concrete social processes in institutions, organisations, techniques, etc. On the side of
civil society, the institutions and organisations where this hegemonic process plays out are mainly the
press, the media, schools, churches, trade unions, cultural associations, political parties, business
associations, etc. (Coutinho 8 Sette-Camara, 2012). On the side of government, we are then concerned
with the central and local government organisations such as parliament, councils, ministries, cabinets,
departments, agencies, police, and other public institutions. The at times close relationships between
individual actors and organisations from both ‘sides’ strengthens even more the importance of
hegemonic analysis. While the primary focus of our research is the relationship between government
and civil society, other social systems can also be important regardes as part ofthe state, most notably
the economic system. Another important social sphere to consider is the legal system (note that Gramsci
includes the courts on the side of ‘political society‘ or government). We are thinking here for example of
legal procedures against governmental policies or urban development projects, or more generally the
role of the courts in the system of checks and balances. Analysis of governance should then focus on
the nature of the relations between the different spheres of the state, both coercive and hegemonic.
Governance of the educational system is for instance influenced through coercive government policy
(e.g. legal age of attendance, curriculum), hegemonic consensus (e.g. learning of norms and values,
sometimes conflicting) and even economic positions (e.g. reproducing inequalities). Labour unions are
another example: in Belgium they are linked to the economic positions as representative organisations
and play an important role in the public sphere, they take part in the labour policy process, they deliver
unemployment benefits and as such thus also implement government policy.
This does not mean however that the dynamic between government and civil society is determined by
a single ideological hegemonic force - although Gramsci‘s notion of the ‘historical bloc’ does imply it.
While in Gramsci‘s view civil society is to be seen as the domain of hegemony, at the same time it is the
place where possibilities for alternatives to hegemony can be formulated — often referred to as
counterhegemony(Agusti‘n 8 Jorgensen, 2016," Katz, 2006," Loopmans, 2008), although Gramsci himself
does not use this term (Buttigieg, 2009; Gramsci, 2006). The idea of counterhegemony thus points to the
role civil society plays in challenging hegemonic dominance and as such can form the basis for political
and social change. However, we would argue that in light of our discussion so far it is analytically more
fruitful to replace this idea of ‘counterhegemony’ for the idea of multiple hegemonies. This is more than
a semantic change in the use of concepts, but refers to the role both government and civil society play
in the hegemonic dynamic. Such an analysis makes use of more nuanced models that moves beyond
‘government vs. civil society‘ narratives and instead focus on interactions in different social arenas or
coalitions consisting of actors from different social spheres (both civil society and government). Good
examples can be found in literature on urban governance where planning conflicts are often built on
converging and conflicting imaginaries (Vanhellemont, 2016) or visions (Vermeulen, 2015) that are
constructed in interactions between actors across governmental institutions, civil society and markets.
We wish to emphasise that this construction of hegemonies is not exclusively tied to civil society —
contrary to the classical Gramscian view. Governmental actors are not to be reduced to a single
analytical narrative of enforcers of policy. Many governmental actors are active in civil society
themselves (De Rynck 8 Verschuere, 2014) or take action inside their departments that does not always
converge with official policy (Barnes, 2009; Lipsky, 2010; Prior 8 Barnes, 2011). Even when staying inside
the domain of government one can see important differences between governmental institutions, as for
example between urban and central governments - see discussions on issues such as climate change
(Bulkeley 8 Betsill, 2005, 2013) of refugee policies (for instance the debate on ‘sanctuary cities‘ - e.g.
Bauder (2017)).
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However, this makes it easy to forget that while hegemony is built on consensus the use of coercion is
not absent (Davies, 2014a). in Gramscian terms: hegemony is never without its ‘armour of coercion’.
Examples of this can be found on the level of urban governance, with the use of coercive managerial
procedures and norms in urban planning, despite collaborative rhetoric and techniques. Davies argues
that local governments in the UK have a wide array of coercive techniques at their disposal that can
result in an "administrative domination”: "Depending on state-specific divisions of labour, these include
juridical enforcement, policing, incarceration, school inspection and traffic and housing management
(bailiffs, traffic wardens and rent collectors)“ (2014b; p. 8).
To conclude, we take from Gramsci‘s theory the hegemonic integration of government and civil society
through the construction of concrete institutions. This is a form of power that has the ability to stabilise
the governance of the state; hegemonic institutions and ideologies create stability that mere coercive
power could not achieve. However, we argue that this stability is not to be regarded as the expression
of a single overarching hegemony, but as the socially situated temporary convergence of multiple
hegemonies around social issues. Furthermore, the notion of multiple hegemonies is analytically more
consistent in light of our understanding of contemporary ‘decentred’ society (3.1). We therefore argue
that in order to analyse the relationship between government and civil society we need to bring into
view which institutions are at play and how they are related to the hegemonic dynamics of the specific
governance arrangement.
3.4.2 Governmentality
Already visible in the concept of ‘hegemony’ is the insight that certain ideas can be productive for
maintaining a certain social order. With the notion of “passive revolution“ Gramsci identifies how political
questions can be transformed into technical and bureaucratic questions, disengaged from any political
discussion (Gramsci, 2006). The notion that forms of knowledge (including accompanying methods and
technologies) are connected with forms of power is more extensively explored by Michel Foucault
(2008). in the third paragraph of this paper we have already stated how his notion of "governmentality“
has inspired a large body of work concerning the relationship between government and civil society. As
with Gramsci‘s notion of hegemony, power and knowledge in this line ofthought are not linked through
ideology, and they cannot be reduced to each other (Triantafillou, 2012). Governmentality is a useful
notion for the discussion in this paper, because it focuses our attention to the myriad ways whereby
modern society is characterised by ‘governance through self-governance‘. Foucault approached
governance in a broad sense as "the conduct of conduct” (2008), by which he referred to “a form of
activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons“ (Burchell, Gordon, 8
Miller, 1991, p. 2). This notion sits very well with the idea of decentralised governance coordination
inside the state (Marinetto, 2003b). Jessop even sees governance as always encompassing some form
of governmentality (lessop, 2016).
With this concept Foucault draws attention to the decentralised working of power in the state. it is a
portmanteau of “government“ and “rationality” that expresses the insight that governmentality concerns
a modern form of power as well as a way of knowledge-construction. As a form of power,
governmentality operates besides other forms of power such as sovereign power, disciplinary power,
hegemonic power, etc. (Bevir, 2011, p. 457; Burchell et al., 1991; Foucault, 2008; Triantafillou, 2012). As
an expression of knowledge-construction it highlights how “the technologies of government are
dependent upon human-based knowledges (sociology, criminology, economics) and intellectual
technologies such as social statistics, census studies, charts and so on. it is only by generating or
attaining knowledge that governmental technologies are able to direct the conduct of individuals, groups
and the population as a whole.“ (Marinetto, 2003b, p. 633). Some authors use this concept to speak of
forms of neoliberal governmentality (2016; Triantafillou, 2012) as the way in which the self-governing
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capacities of individuals (and civil society in general) are encouraged in modern society in such a way
that it stimulates the larger neoliberal societal order. However, governmentality is not to be understood
as a class project, since the power-knowledge coupling is not to be reduced to certain specific group or
class interests (Triantafillou, 2012).
Again, we see here a form of power constitutive for the relation between government and civil society.
Starting from the idea that government has limited reach as the central command-and-control centre of
society, the question then becomes how any form of integration of society can take place. Besides
hegemonic power (through leadership and consensus) and disciplinary or coercive power, Foucault
points to a more diffused form of power, one that permeates civil society as well as government. Bell
and Hindmoor refer to it as “governance through persuasion” (2009), but this would seem more fitted
for the power of hegemonies. instead, governmentality focuses on the use of knowledge and governing
‘techniques’ that are established as powerful institutions guiding much of social and political life. The key
insight is that as governments ‘lose’ their central position, social actors are not guided through direct
governmental intervention but through a variety of techniques that aim to ensure their conduct falls
within the boundaries of the state. As we have illustrated in Box 3, "neoliberalism" literature uses the
concepts of hegemony and governmentality to analyse how neoliberalism has permeated social and
political life. Not only does neoliberalism concern specific policies and reforms, the production of capital,
and the diffusion of ideas and ideology, but also certain type of self-observation and self-governance.
Governmentality research thus show how self-governance is notjust a question of making ‘free’ choices
and autonomous decisions, but also that it is in many ways influenced by hegemonic beliefs and power
dynamics.
3.4.2.1 Governmentality and functional differentiation
Triantafillou and Esmark have confronted the perspectives of governmentality and functional
differentiation with each other (Esmark 8 Triantafillou, 2009), and show how both perspectives can
supplement each other. They argue that while the governmentality approach focuses more on the
evolution ‘self-governance’ as such, functional differentiation is more suited to observe the ways
different programmes and mediums are combined. The evolution of governance from the perspective
of functional differentiation can be seen in terms of how government (as organisation) operates more
and more not only with the programmes, scripts and media used by the political function system, but
also with those used by other function systems, such as the economy and science (see also Esmark
(2009)). When combined however, these perspectives can offer insights into the workings of
governance:
”(...) the introduction of HRM-techniques, seminars and the self-development of the modern
employee can be described as strategically nursing and increasing the freedom ofthe employee
as well as the coding of modern management in the medium of love and the appropriation of
the programmes and discoursed of the family. The introduction of benchmarking, evidence-
based policy, naming and shaming so central to current public governance can be described as
normalising power beyond discipline, as well as copying and emulation of scientific mediums
and routines by public authorities etc." (Esmark 8 Triantafillou, 2009, p. 37)
This also means that in analysing governance arrangements we will have to reflect whether observed
techniques and beliefs (e.g. competitiveness, performance measurement, or standards in public services
provided by nonprofits) are produced by a government that uses programmes and mediums from
science and economy (as proposed by the hypothesis of functional differentiation) or rather if these
observations point to how actors in civil society and government ‘govern themselves’ (as can be
observed through the lens of governmentality). The governmentality approach also works in studying
how governmental actors and institutions are internally organised, as another study by Triantafillou
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(2012) shows. Specifically focusing on “those who govern” (2012, p. 71) (public agencies, public
managers and civil servants) Triantafillou also argues how specific techniques in government have
gained wide influence, specifically incentive systems, contracts, performance measurement and
standards (2012, p. 53): "they are not only significantly changing the ways in which civil servants are
governed, they also - more or less directly - imply new ways of governing citizens and social groups.”
(2012, p. 68). Not only are these techniques widely spread, the perspective of governmentality shows
that they are not easy to ignore or escape. if one were to point out that standards and indicators don’t
succeed in correctly measuring performance, this would “only serve to reinforce the quest for more
and/or‘better’ performance measuring and management." (2012, p. 69). Underlyingthese techniques
there is thus a general acceptance that some specific form of incentive, standard or measurement is
necessary. Triantafillou argues that it is hard to identify a specific hegemonic way of governance
strategies. There does however seem to be a more general hegemonic belief surrounding the
governance debate, in Western European countries at the least: "How - by what means - can we
stimulate the self-governing capacities of individuals, groups and public administrations?" (2012, p. 170).
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 4 I Conclusion: analysing governance arrangements
We have set out to develop a framework for analysis in order to understand how the interaction between
civil society and governments is formed by the institutions of specific governance arrangements,
concerning the role of civil society in political work and civil service delivery.
The relationship between government and civil society has been discussed in terms of three main
concerns: developing a framework that captures the internal complexity of both domains as well as their
interaction; providing an alternative to the hierarchy-market-network model of analysis; and
understanding the dynamics of power in the construction of governance arrangements. in order to
achieve this we propose a Gramscian inspired framework for analysis. The complexities we have
outlined in the second paragraph are captured by this framework, given that we follow contemporary
neo-Gramscian approaches that do not link hegemonic dynamics to specific ‘classes’. instead, we
proposed a more nuanced model that looks at the multitude of actors on the side of both government
and civil society without losing the perspective of their integration in the wider construction of the state.
We have argued how ‘networks’ and ‘markets’ cannot be considered institutions in the same vein as
‘bureaucracies’ (6, 2015a), and propose a more ‘agnostic’ approach to governance institutions. indeed,
bureaucracies are still very much part of state organisation and should not be too easily considered as
"displaced" by the mechanisms of exchange (markets) or the dynamics of complex ties (networks). The
framework we propose instead focuses on the construction of governance arrangements in different
social arenas or coalitions consisting of actors from different social positions. We believe that this
framework gives a central position to power in the analysis. This not only concerns the coercive power
that lies behind rules and norms, which of course should not be ignored. We also focus on how
hegemonic beliefs, knowledge and techniques ofself-governance are constructed by and have an impact
on actors and institutions in both government and civil society.
The key issue that we will have to develop further is how this framework can be further operationalised
in terms of the specific interactions between government and civil society. Our analysis needs to be able
to bring into view the specific processes of power in the governance arrangement (hegemony, coercion,
governmentality), and it has to be suited to capture the institutional complexity of the governance
arrangements. insights from institutional theory as proposed in recent work by Lowndes and Roberts
(2013) offers insights that seem worth exploring further. An institutional approach offers insights into
how constraints and limitations of possible actions (such as through different forms of power) are
precisely the key to understanding why and how institutions work. in general, institutions are stable
configurations of generalised expectations that constrain the possibilities of events (Baraldi, Corsi, 8
Esposito, 1997; Luhmann, 2013). it is precisely because possibilities are constrained that any
communication or action can occur. if there were no constraints, the complexity of social events would
be so great that it would be paralysing. Thus understood, institutions unburden social relations from
constantly having to develop new ways of operating. The institution of “family”, for example, bring with
it certain ‘expected expectations‘ around which all members can interact: mutual support, safety,
solidarity, etc. This is precisely what makes institutions so powerful: they reduce complexity and make
action possible. in order to understand how institutions function we must be able to analyse howthese
expectations are visible for the actors involved. We differ however from the somewhat more narrow
take on power of Lowndes and Roberts. While they have a rich understanding ofthe institutional effect
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of power, they relate power ultimately to the action of an (individual or collective) actor against another
actor (Lowndes 8 Roberts, 2013, pp. 78-79). Thus, institutions are seen as enabling or constraining these
actions, but are not considered as instances of power themselves. Regarding the earlier discussions of
hegemonic power and governmentality, we argue that power of certain social actors is not only built on
their actions against other actors. The diffusion of certain techniques and types of knowledge in
themselves have constraining and enabling effects that affect some social groups more than others - in
this sense it can be said that these groups ‘have’ a certain power, although it concerns a diffused set of
events and occurrences. Building on the insights of Gramscian and Foucauldian literature we argue that
institutions themselves already reflect the power relations of governance arrangements.
Our discussion thus ends somewhat open ended. instead of proposing a fully worked out theory to
continue our research, we have instead brought together different theories on governance and sought
out encounters between theories that can mutually reinforce each other. in the following phases of our
research we must now use build on these encounters to develop a conceptually consistent approach
that can guide our understanding of governance arrangements.
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